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LAW, URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE POOR
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*
JAMES L. MAGAVERN**
JOHN THOMAS***
MYRA STUART****
I. THE PROBLEM OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT
One of the great problems of the poor countries of the world has
been their inability to cope with massive and unprecedented urbaniza-
tion.' Governments have been unable either to stem the flow of peo-
* An earlier version of this Article was presented to the Committee on Legal Serv-
ices to the Poor in the Developing Countries at a conference held at the International
Legal Center in New York City in November 1973. It was rewritten and presented in
November 1974 to a seminar on law and the city, conducted by the East-West Center
in Honolulu, in which Mr. Magavern participated as a Senior Fellow. It has benefited
from the valuable criticisms of the other members of the seminar, Ester de Jesus Amor,
Tai-joon Kwon, Ernest V. Devadson, and John J. Costonis. The Article incorporates
another paper prepared for the seminar, "Law and Illegal Settlement in Manila," which
will be published by the East-West Center with the other seminar papers.
** County Attorney, Erie County, New York; Adjunct Professor of Law, State
University of New York at Buffalo. LL.B., University of Buffalo.
*** Associate Professor of Environmental Analysis and Policy, State University of
New York at Buffalo. Ph.D., 1966, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
**** Assistant County Attorney, Erie County, New York. B.A., 1960, University
of Buffalo; M.A., 1964, Ph.D., 1972, J.D., 1974, State University of New York at Buf-
falo.
1. Several disclaimers are in order. First, the authors do not assume that urban
development policies designed to favor the poor will necessarily foster national economic
growth, political stability, or other developmental ends. Nor do we assume that the gen-
eral long-term interests of the poor would necessarily be advanced most effectively by
policies according a high priority to the immediate, environmental needs of the urban
poor. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article. We believe, however, that
those needs do deserve more attention than they have received. Secondly, we do not
accept the notions that there is a single process--and a single end--of development and
that the poor countries are in various stages of this process. Nor do we assume that
the processes of change underway in the poorer countries (or in the richer countries for
that matter) necessarily represent development in the sense of improvement It does
seem that the welfare of the people is in fact improving in some of the poorer countries.
Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, the conventional term "developing country"
will be used. Thirdly, rapid urbanization can engender a need for legal services for the
poor in several ways. Social life may depend upon legal relationships to a greater ex-
tent in rural than in urban areas. By disrupting traditional institutions and primary rela-
tionships, urbanization may require greater recourse to legal institutions to define social
norms and relationships, to resolve disputes, and to maintain social order. It should be
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ple into the cities or to manage urban development to provide an ac-
ceptable environment for their swelling populations. The resulting gap
between rapid urbanization and grossly inadequate urban development
has been manifested in generally deteriorating urban environmental
conditions and, most dramatically, in the proliferation of squatter settle-
ments in the interstices and peripheries of the major cities. The poor
especially have suffered from the inadequacy of urban development.
They have been left to develop urban settlements by their own efforts,
and governments have tended at best to neglect and at worst to disrupt
and destroy these settlements.
In this Article, the potential role of legal services for the urban poor
in achieving levels and forms of urban development more satisfactory
to their welfare will be considered. It will be seen that the inadequacy
of urban development policies is a manifestation of the fundamental
problems of political development confronting the poor countries and
that only under uncommonly favorable political conditions can legal
services prove effective in securing more favorable environmental con-
ditions for the urban poor.
This Article is directly concerned with urban squatters. While many
squatters are not poor, most of the urban poor are squatters. The most
significant challenge of urban development to the governments of devel-
oping countries, in improving the welfare of the poor, is to accom-
modate and enhance the process of spontaneous development
manifested in squatter settlements. Our analysis and conclusions will
be determined and limited to a great extent by the condition that
noted, however, that recent studies suggest that the disruptive effect of urbanization upon
the poor has been exaggerated and that the urban poor are often quite capable of de-
veloping their own forms of social order. See generally K. KARST, M. ScHwARTz &
A. ScHwARTZ, THm EVOLUTION OF LAW IN THE BARRIos OF CARACAS (1973); A.
LAQUIAN, SLumS ARE FOR PEOPLE (1971); PEASANTS IN CITIES: READINGS IN URDAN
ANTHROPOLOGY (W. Mangin ed. 1970).
The problem of the extent of the disruptive effects of urbanization is, however, beyond
the scope of this Article. Our concern is with a narrower set of issues. The policies
and programs adopted by government in response to urbanization may create a specific
need for legal services to the poor, insofar as they are affected by those policies. To
the extent that programs are designed to benefit the poor, legal services may be required
to assure effective implementation. See Metzger, Legal Services to the Poor and Na-
tional Development Objectives, in LEGAL Am AN WOLD POVERTY, A SURVEY OF ASIA,
AFiCA AND LATIN AMERCA 3-18 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL Am AND WORLD
POVERTY]. And to the extent that programs work against the interests of the poor,
legal representation may help the poor resist or alter their implementation.
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squatters, by definition, do not have a legal right to the land on which
they live. Insofar as the political limits of law and legal representa-
tion of the poor are concerned, consideration of legal services in relation
to urban squatting will have broader implications. The problems of
the poor consist not only in a lack of formal rights (as distinguished
from inadequate access to adjudicatory and enforcement institutions),
but also in governments' inability to give effect to laws, programs, and
policies that favor the poor.
A. The Urban Development Gap
The magnitude of the gap between massive urbanization and inade-
quate urban development needs little demonstration. While national
populations have been increasing at rates of two to three and one-half
percent per year, the larger cities of the poor nations have been growing
at two or three times those rates and now contain three to ten times
their pre-World War II populations.2 Yet many cities still depend upon
essentially pre-war infrastructure systems. Often, piped water and
sewer systems are available to less than one-fourth of the urban dwel-
lings. A number of major cities have no sewer systems at all. While
improvements of roads, bridges, and public transportation systems
have received a high priority in the allocation of public funds, the
resultant construction has not kept pace with urban expansion and an
increasing use of automobiles by the more affluent.
The gap between rich and poor is most obvious in the case of hous-
ing. Only the upper and middle classes have been able to afford con-
ventional urban housing on planned streets with sufficient municipal
services. In a process aptly characterized as autonomous urban settle-
ment, 3 the poor have built their own housing on whatever land and from
whatever materials-packing crates, scrap metal, palm leaves-they
have been able to find. The quality of their housing varies from quite
satisfactory to wretched. The more basic problems lie not in the
quality of the individual houses, but in the lack of water, sanitation,
and, above all, legally secure possession of home sites. Nearly one third
of the populations of some of the major cities of India-unable to find
2. UNITED NATIONS, GROWTH OF THE WoRLD's URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION,
1920-2000 (1969).
3. Turner, Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies, in TIM CrrG
iN NEWLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 507-34 (G. Breese ed. 1969).
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accommodation other than that offered by sidewalks, railroad stations,
and other public places-are classified as pavement dwellers.4  In
most of the poor countries, squatter settlements comprise from one-
fourth to one-half of the population of the larger cities.5 Even Sing-
apore, which has achieved extraordinary success in fostering economic
growth, urban development, and rising standards of general wel-
fare, has accorded low priority in urban planning policy to the immedi-
ate needs of the poor. Since 1959, the government has ameliorated
a severe housing shortage by constructing public housing for nearly half
the population of the city.6 Despite its achievements, the government
has failed to provide adequate housing for the poorest quarter of the
population. Moreover, in order to provide land for urban development
projects, the government has razed squatter settlements and densely in-
habited neighborhoods of old shop houses, driving the poor out of low-
cost housing and disrupting their community-based economic and social
relationships.7
In general, the environmental problems of the urban poor are at-
tributable to the low priority those problems have received in the
operation of public policy as well as to the insufficiency of public re-
sources for urban development. The overriding objective of most gov-
ernments appears to be to develop the city as an efficient and prestigi-
ous center for government and the modem sector of the economy, with
the expectation that in the long run the poor will benefit from economic
growth and national development. That objective tends to conflict
with the immediate interests of the poor, not only in the allocation of
public investment funds, but also, and more importantly, in the alloca-
tion of land. Competing demands for locations accessible to employ-
ment and urban services, whether on land already occupied by the poor
in squatter or slum settlements or on peripheral land ripe for conver-
sion to urban use, are intensified by the inadequacy of urban transpor-
tation systems and by the sheer size and speed of growth of the largest
cities of the developing countries.
4. PAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 19, 1974, at 47.
5. Turner, supra note 3, at 507.
6. See generally H. Stockwin, Housing: Running in Order to Stand Still, FPAR E.
EcoN. REV., Aug. 9, 1974, at Supp. 22 [Focus: Singapore in Asia '74], citing 1973-74
SINeGAPOrE HouSING Dav. BD. ANN. REP.
7. See I. BUCHANAN, SI GAPOPM IN SouTHEAST ASm (1972); R. GAmER, TH PoLi-
Tics oF URBAN DEvELopMENT iN SiNcAioR (1972).
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B. Alternative Policies
It is clear that the governments of most of the developing nations
have not been able to respond effectively to rapid urbanization, par-
ticularly in respect to the welfare of the poor. It is not clear that more
effective policies are available.
Can the process of urbanization itself be checked? Urbanization in
Europe and North America is generally considered to have been both
a condition and a consequence of industrial development. It has pro-
ceeded at rates corresponding to the growth of employment in urban-
based industry and has been more or less manageable. Post-war urbani-
zation in the developing countries has proceeded far more rapidly than
industrial development and in great part outside the scope of institu-
tional management. Many observers have deplored what they con-
ceive to be pathological, premature, or pseudo-urbanization in the de-
veloping countries. Noting the inadequacy of employment opportuni-
ties and the squalid physical conditions of life in the cities, especially
for the poor, they have warned of socially and politically disruptive con-
sequences and have advocated policies to check urban immigration or
at least divert migration away from the largest cities. On the same as-
sumptions, governments have occasionally announced rather half-
hearted policies to check the process of urban growth. In recent years,
however, the debate has taken a more positive turn. It has been argued
that urbanization should be encouraged since it provides economies of
scale and agglomeration, drains surplus labor from the countryside,
making it available to the modernizing industrial sector, and promotes
social and political modernization.8
The debate over the desirability of rapid urbanization is, however,
essentially irrelevant to the subject of this Article. In terms of the
welfare of the poor, there is no reason to believe that urban in-migrants
are not seeking out the best opportunities available to them, and
finding better though meager opportunities in the cities than in the
8. See generally THE CriY IN NEwLY DEVELOPING COUNIES (G. Breese, ed.
1969); J. FkmDMANN, URBANIzA.ToN, PLANNING AND NATIONAL DEVELoPMENT (1973);
G. MyRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA 467-71 (1968); R. POETHIG, CrrIs ARE FOR LIVING (1972);
UAamAzLTor AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (L. Jacobson & V. Prakash, eds. 1971);
Dotson & Tenune, On the Consequences of Urbanization, in MET oPoLrAN GRowTH:
PUBLIC POLICY FOR SOUTH AND SouTHEAsT AsL, 1343 (L. Jacobson & V. Prakash, eds.
1974); Jacobson & Prakash, Urban Planning in the Context of a "New Urbanization,"
in id. at 259-86.
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countryside. Nonetheless, most governments do not appear to have
the economic and political capacity to alter the causes of rapid urban
population growth or satisfactorily deal with the problems that re-
sult. Cities will continue to grow from natural increase of the urban
population. In addition, overpopulation of rural areas in relation to
their economic base contributes heavily to urban in-migration. In many
countries, rural areas are already overpopulated and lack additional
arable land for cultivation. Rural population growth may be reduced
somewhat, but over the next two decades it will necessarily continue at
rapid rates.9 Although agricultural productivity can be increased
greatly, the process is a slow one, unlikely to absorb labor at a rate
corresponding to population growth. To the contrary, in some cases,
mechanization of agriculture may displace labor. Continued rural-
urban migration, therefore, seems inevitable.
Industrial dispersal has been advocated as a means to divert immi-
gration from large cities to smaller regional centers. In a few in-
stances, such as Ciudad Guyana in Venezuela, the Jurong Industrial
Estate in Singapore, the Kaohsiung port and foreign trade zone in Tai-
wan, and the Ulsan industrial complex in Korea, there may be oppor-
tunities to establish complexes of industries in new centers favored
by proximity to raw materials or natural harbors. The poor countries,
however, cannot afford to increase the costs of industrial development
by barring it from urban areas. In general, the necessary economic
data and analytical techniques are not available to determine the com-
parative costs of industrial location in outlying regions and major cities.
Although policies giving priority to development of the countryside
may be desirable, few governments have the political capacity to retard
the growth of cities, either by rapid and intensive reorganization of the
rural economy or by directing the location of human settlement and
economic activity. It seems, therefore, that continued rapid urbaniza-
tion must be accepted as inevitable. Hence, if government is to re-
spond effectively, attention must be turned to positive urban develop-
ment policies.
Is the answer, then, to allocate a greater share of national resources
to the urban sector? We do not believe so. In an analysis of the
national economic development plans of Malaysia and Thailand, Pro-
9. The age structure of the populations alone would assure continued population
growth, even if the most optimistic predictions for family planning are realized.
[Vol. 1975:45
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fessor Donald Fryer found that, despite considerable rhetorical empha-
sis upon rural development and reduction of urban-rural income in-
equalities, the plans in fact allocated a disproportionate share of de-
velopment investments to the urban sector. Failing to allocate to the
rural sector a share proportional to the size of its work force or even
its contribution to national product, the plans implicitly contemplated
a widening of the urban-rural income gap.' 0 Similarly, in the Philip-
pines the declared goals of industrial dispersal and accelerated de-
velopment of lagging regions have been ignored in the public invest-
ment program of the current four-year development plans and the
granting of industrial investment incentives by the Board of Invest-
ment.11 There is little reason to think that similar patterns do not exist
in other developing countries. Nevertheless, a convincing case has
not been made, in the interest of either social justice or economic
development, for the allocation of a greater share of national resources
to urban development.
Most of the developing countries have experimented with a variety
of public housing techniques and policies. Although few have con-
structed public housing on more than a token scale, many continue to
postulate low-cost public housing as the ultimate solution to the urban
housing problem. The cheapest cost per unit for conventional public
housing in a poor country is at least $2,000. In comparison, it is pos-
sible for a squatter to build a satisfactory house at a cost of about $100,
and it is possible to provide essential infrastructure facilities for another
$100 per unit.'12 As already noted, Singapore has provided public hous-
ing for nearly half of its population. Singapore is not a poor country,
however; it is a city-state of about 2.2 million people, with a per capita
income now in excess of U.S. $1,500 per year.' 3 Yet even in Singapore,
the poor cannot afford public housing. In most of the poor countries con-
10. D. Fryer, National Development Plans and the Budget: Public Sector Resources
for Urbanization, March 24, 1969 (unpublished discussion paper prepared for Southeast
Asia Development Advisory Group [SEADAG] Urban Development Seminar at the
East-West Center).
11. A. Santiago & J. Magavern, National Planning Legislation in the Philippines 11-
12, Oct. 1971 (Occasional Paper No. 6 for U. of Phil. Inst. of Planning).
12. Cf. R. STONE, PHILIpPiE URBANIzATIoN: THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN GaRATER MANILA 57 (1973); Etherington, Facing the Squatter Problem in
Developing Countries, SOLIDARITY, July 1973, at 8-9; Sadove, A View of the Urban
Needs of Developing Nations, SOLDARITY, Sept. 1973, at 51-59.
13. See C. Lee, Economy: Optimism, but Caution Prevails, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Aug. 9, 1974, at Supp. 16, 18 [Focus: Singapore in Asia '74].
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ventional public housing is not economically feasible for more than a
small fraction of the urban population.
If, then, most governments are unable to check continued rapid ur-
banization, commit a greater share of public resources to urban de-
velopment, or construct conventional public housing within the means
of either the poor or the government, what sort of urban planning and
development policies might make possible a more effective response
to the environmental needs of urban citizens, especially the poor?
Professional urban planning in most of the developing countries, as in
the western world, has been dominated until recently by the illusion of
the comprehensive master plan. The traditional master plan repre-
sented an attempt to lay out in maps and documents an ultimate physi-
cal design of the city, to be brought into being over a period of twenty
or more years. In the last two decades, as the limitations of a static
and design-centered planning process have been thoroughly exposed, 14
the planning profession has shifted to a more comprehensive concern
with social conditions, economic policy, and intermediate-term pro-
gramming in pursuance of plan implementation. Nevertheless, com-
prehensive, long-term urban planning has remained a futile exercise
in most of the developing countries, as well as in the United States.
A number of ambitious urban planning projects have been undertaken
in major cities of poor countries. None has had a significant direct im-
pact upon the course of urban development.' 5  Rather, urban planning
has tended to become bogged down in empirical studies and theoretical
deliberations, which have been out-paced by rapid urban growth and
economic and political change. Of equal importance, urban planners
have failed to recognize the inevitable economic, administrative, legal,
and, above all, political constraints upon the capacity of government
to finance, organize, and direct urban settlement and development.
While governments have been criticized harshly for failure to im-
plement plans, the fault lies as much with planners who have con-
tinued to produce utterly unrealistic planning documents.
14. See Friedmann, The Future of Comprehensive Urban Planning: A Critique,
PUB. AD. REV. May-June 1971, at 315; Friedmann & Hudson, Knowledge and Action:
A Guide to Planning Theory, 40 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 2 (1974).
15. This is not to deny that such projects may yield more indirect benefits through
the development and dissemination of knowledge or eventual implementation of elements
of the plan. The World Bank, for example, is now considering assistance to Calcutta
for a complex of urban development projects based upon a plan and studies completed
in 1966 by a massive planning effort heavily supported by the Ford Foundation,
[Vol. 1975:45
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In recent years, planning theorists have persuasively criticized com-
prehensive, technocratic rationality as a model of planning,"0 but they
have failed to produce a functional methodology of urban planning that
is not vulnerable to the criticisms they themselves make. Perhaps for
this reason, planning practitioners have generally continued to adhere
to the ideal of comprehensive planning.
Nevertheless, in recognition of the impracticability of large-scale
public housing and the futility of comprehensive master planning, a
consensus has begun to take shape about the limits and elements of
a more effective approach to urban planning and development in poor
countries. This emerging consensus may tentatively be summed up in
the phrases "action planning" and "sites-and-services." The most in-
fluential proponent of this more pragmatic approach was Charles
Abrams.'7 In the report of a United Nations Mission to Singapore,
Abrams and two colleagues, Susumu Kobe and Otto Keonigsberger, did
not attempt a detailed, comprehensive master plan. Rather, their report
recommended a set of environmental performance standards, a guiding
concept, and independently-planned programs of action.:' Because its
emphasis was upon workable programs for specifically identified de-
velopment projects, this approach was termed "action planning." The
report's planning concept was compatible with the highly pragmatic, re-
sult-directed style of the Lee Kuan Yew administration. Indeed, the
Singapore government adopted a far more ad hoc form of planning
than the authors of the report contemplated. The guiding concept of
a ring of diversified settlements around the perimeter of the island was
ignored. In its determination to execute specific projects quickly and
efficiently, the government tended to pay insufficient attention to the
contents of its Master Plan, the recommendations of its planning de-
partment, and the social impact of its physical development projects. 9
Nonetheless, Singapore's remarkable achievements in urban and eco-
nomic development are attributable, at least in part, to an incremental,
project-centered and relatively short-term approach to planning.
As an alternative to conventional public housing for the poor,
16. See, e.g., Friedmann & Hudson, supra note 14, and sources cited.
17. See generally C. ABRAMS, MAN'S STRUGGLE FOR SHELTER IN AN URBANIZING
WORLD (1964).
18. C. ABRAMs, S. KOBE, & 0. KOENIGSBERGER, REPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
SiNoAPoRE (1963).
19. For an excellent analysis of the political context of the planning process, see
R. GAmn, supra note 7.
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Abrams proposed a more realistic approach, which in more recent ela-
borations has become known by the term "sites-and-services.12 0  The
essential idea is to turn to advantage the process of spontaneous urban
development now manifested in squatter settlements. A sites-and-ser-
vices policy calls for the improvement of existing squatter settlements
by provision of essential urban facilities and services, including access,
fresh water, drainage, and sewage disposal. In a subsequent phase,
provision is made for the planning of similar but more highly organized
new settlements with sites-and-services development as an integral part
of the urban expansion process.
The most obvious advantages of a sites-and-services policy are eco-
nomic. For example, in the Philippines, the cost of providing sewage
collection, asphalt roads, and water mains and laterals to each house
in a tract containing building lots of one-hundred square meters has been
roughly estimated at U.S. $100 per unit. A Manila squatter can con-
struct a decent dwelling at a cost of approximately U.S. $100 more.
Hence, the total cost of housing and site development is approximately
U.S. $200.21 In contrast, the cost of construction of conventional apart-
ments or single-family houses is at least $2,000. Moreover, the con-
struction and costs of owner-built housing can be phased over a number
of years by the owner's progressive improvement of his house in a man-
ner that would not be feasible for publicly built housing.22
Beyond purely economic considerations, a sites-and-services policy
has other potential merits. It would enable squatter communities to
retain their social cohesiveness, accessibility to employment and public
transportation, and household and community-based occupations such
as hawking, small-scale retail trade and services, and part-time fishing
and poultry-raising. Such a policy would direct a more equitable share
of the benefits of public infrastructure investments to the poor.
Finally, by bringing squatting within the law and the planning process,
a sites-and-services policy would enable governments to manage urban-
ization and urban development more effectively. Until alternative
20. See C. ABRAMS, supra note 17; C. ABRAMS, SQuATmR SETrLEMENTs: THE
PROBLEM AND THE OPPORTuNiTY (1966); A. LAQuJIN, supra note 1; R. POETHIa, supra
note 8; URaAN PtANNniN iN DFvELOPIN I CouNTlnmS (J. Herbert & A. Van Huyck eds.
1968); Sadove, supra note 12; Turner, supra note 3; Van Huyck & Rosser, An Environ-
mental Approach to Low Income Housing, 8 INT'L D.v. Rnv. 15 (1966).
21. Etherington, supra note 12.
22. See Turner, Barriers and Channels for Housing Development in Modernizing
Countries, 33 J. AM, INST. PLANNERS 167 (1967).
[Vol. 1975:45
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/9
LAW, URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE POOR
urban settlement opportunities are made available, most governments
cannot reasonably expect to bring squatting under control. If a feasible
alternative to illegal and uncontrolled autonomous settlement is to be
developed, it must start with a "minimal standards approach"2 3 of legal-
izing, supporting, and improving the process. Such an approach must
attempt to impose only those controls required to reconcile inexorable
settlement pressures with essential planning objectives, such as rational
locational arrangements and provision of basic services and facilities.2'
If successful, a policy of this kind would further serve to reduce the
strain on the legal system arising from sporadic or arbitrary enforcement
of the law. Experience has demonstrated convincingly that, under cur-
rent distribution and legal norms of land ownership, the gap between
the formal legal system and the social needs and values represented
by urban squatting cannot be closed simply by attempting to enforce
the existing law more rigorously against squatters. The only alterna-
tive is to accommodate those needs and values within the legal system.
A sites-and-services policy, to be successful, would have to be imple-
mented on a large scale. Otherwise, in their quest for land, unmanage-
able numbers of squatters would press into areas designated for distribu-
tion, and, even in the face of a forfeiture clause, many would sell their
"rights" to more affluent land seekers and resume squatting elsewhere.
If possible, sites should be provided for middle-income as well as low-in-
come families and for commercial and industrial as well as residential
and community use. Ideally, if all or most urban land were to be
brought within public ownership, distribution and occupancy should be
by leasehold. If, however, private ownership is to remain the dominant
form of urban land tenure for the foreseeable future, then, for all but the
most destitute, an installment purchase plan should be established to
cover the costs of site acquisition and development, even though collec-
tion of the installments and administration of the plan might prove ex-
tremely difficult or impossible.
Most squatting has been on public land. Where such land is not
urgently needed for some other use, tenure should be stabilized and
minimal facilities and services introduced. Extremely dense and irreg-
ular patterns of occupancy make this proposal no easy task. Where
relocation is necessary, it should be on a community-wide basis in
locations as near to the prior residence as possible in order to mini-
23. Sadove, supra note 12, has used this phrase.
24. See Turner, supra note 3.
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mize economic and soofal, disruption. To accommodate urban pop-
ulation growth and squatters relocated from other sites, new sites
should be included in urban expansion schemes, to be developed as
infrastructures services are extended outward on the urban periphery.
If sufficient public land were made available, it would be possible
to restrain new squatting on private land. Where private land is already
occupied by squatters, the availability of alternative public sites could
be expected to facilitate private arrangements between owners and
squatters for voluntary removal, probably at lower levels of compensa-
tion than often prevail under present circumstances. In some cases,
the government could acquire and redistribute squatter-occupied pri-
vate land to the squatters, possibly basing compensation to the owner
upon the value of the land as encumbered by squatter occupancy, with
due regard to the difficulties of removal through legal process.e As
an interim measure, police power regulations could be enacted to
restrict the owner's right to evict squatters who had established
occupancy prior to initiation of the program.20 In countries with un-
usually effective governments, the extension of public streets and
utilities and the approval of plans to subdivide and develop private
land could be conditioned upon agreement by the owner to allocate
a portion of the land for use as sites-and-services projects.21
The minimal urban planning and development strategy outlined
above would be difficult, and in some respects perhaps impossible, to
implement. But even if sites-and-services programs were to break
down with respect to site layout, project financing, or linkage to more
comprehensive urban development plans, great improvement could be
realized if a government were effectively able to plan where settlement
would take place, provide some form of community water and sanita-
tion facilities, and allocate a greater share of public investment to the
benefit of the poor. A sites-and-services policy, in other words, could
be of significant value even if imperfectly implemented. The problem,
25. Singapore, which abrogated its constitutional just-compensation clause upon sep-
aration from Malaysia, limits compensation in roughly this way. See Koh, The Law
of Compulsory Acquisition in Singapore, t1967] MALAYAN L.J.
26. Rent control in Singapore has -this effect under certain circumstances. See Koh,
Rent Control in Singapore, 8 MALAYA L. REV. 32-45, 176-232 (1966).
27. In Korea a considerable part of'urban development is carried out in conjunction
with land readjustment schemes; the government takes a portion of the land under de-
velopment as compensation for public costs incurred in providing facilities and executing
the scheme.
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though, is not simply one of technique or knowledge; more fundamen-
tally, it is that the willingness and ability of government to implement
such a policy depend on uncommonly favorable political conditions.
II. THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES TO THE
POOR IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The character and extent of the involvement of the legal profession
in problems of the urban poor have been determined by the size and
structure of the legal profession itself and by the characteristics of the
underlying political system. The provision of legal services to the poor
on an organized basis has tended, in many countries, to evolve in the
following stages:28
1. assignment of counsel to defendants accused of serious crimes;
2. formation of small-scale legal aid clinics as private charitable opera-
tions, serving clients with private-law problems in such areas as do-
mestic relations, wage claims, and property disputes;
3. staff representation of potential beneficiaries of social reform pro-
grams in areas such as agrarian and industrial labor relations;
4. government or other institutional sponsorships of general legal aid
programs designed to enforce existing legal rights and to seek to in-
form, motivate, and defend the poor against the abusive exercise of
both private power and official authority; and
5. attempts, through legal representation, to employ legal and political
processes to organize the poor and to create and give effect to new
legal rights for the poor.
It is not suggested that these stages correspond to any supposed stages
of general development, nor that they necessarily represent a sound
response to the legal problems of the poor. The pattern does not hold
for a number of socialist nations where efforts have been made to de-
professionalize the administration of justice. 9
Many of the poor countries have formally adopted programs similar
to one of the first four described above. More often than not, however,
the governments have failed to provide the necessary financial and
political support to make the programs effective. No program of the
fifth kind has been established in a developing country. The most
ambitious program of that variety-the Neighborhood Legal Service
28. See generally LEGAL AmD AND WoRLD PovnRTY.
29. See N. Tiruchelvam, The Ideology of Popular Justice, 1973 (Working Paper No.
21 for Program in Law and Modernization at the Yale Law School).
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Program in the United States-has been judged a failure, at least when
measured against its initial objectives of sweeping social reform. 0
There is no reason to believe that such a program would be more suc-
cessful in the developing countries.
The impact of law upon urban development policy and the welfare
of the poor has been determined by both its substantive content and
the relative strength or weakness of legal institutions. The basic con-
tradiction between the formal law of property and the needs of the
urban squatters has never been satisfactorily reconciled in either formal
or effective law. Lawyers and legal processes have, at times, played
a substantial role in the adoption and the implementation or frustration
of policies both favorable and unfavorable to the urban poor. With
a single exception, however, organized legal aid programs have failed
to address themselves to the environmental needs of the urban poor.
The reasons and the issues are illustrated by experience in four
countries-Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and the Philippines.
A. Indonesia
The one country in which organized legal aid has been significantly
concerned with urban development policy is Indonesia. In 1968,
Adnan Buyung Nasution, an outstanding young advocate, proposed that
the national bar association establish a legal aid office. 8 The associa-
tion endorsed the proposal and directed Nasution to establish an inde-
pendent legal aid institute. He began by explaining the concept to a
number of judges and government officials and securing their political
support. He then approached General Ali Sadikin, the military
governor of the special district of Jakarta, and presented a formal re-
quest for authorization and financial support for the creation of the pro-
posed Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum). The request
was granted, and the Institute began operations in 1971. Approximately
30. See H. Stumpf, The Failure of Legal Services or Let Them Clean Out Cellars,
Oct. 11, 1973 (paper presented at S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo), to be published in H. STUMPp,
COMMUNITY POLmCS AND LxGAL SE viCEs: Tim OTMR SIDE OF THE LAW (Sage); cf.
Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, Pun. LNT, Spring 1973, at 38.
31. The following text is based on LEGAL Am ND WoRLD POVERTY 155; D. Lev,
Bush-Lawyers in Indonesia: Stratification, Representation, and Brokerage, 1973 (work-
ing paper for the Program in Law and Society at the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley); Interview
with Adnan Buyung Nasution at a meeting of the International Legal Center Committee
on Legal Services to the Poor in the Developing Countries in New York City, November
3-5, 1973.
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eighty percent of the Institute's financial support is provided by the gov-
ernment and twenty percent by private donations. The Institute is staffed
by ten full-time lawyers. In 1972 it received seventy-five applica-
tions for assistance per month and accumulated one hundred fifty civil
and fifty criminal cases to be litigated. In the first half of its third year
of operations, it handled fifteen hundred cases. One of the principal
purposes of the Institute is "to raise the public's consciousness of law,
particularly its rights under law."32 To that end, the Institute has con-
ducted an instructional program for journalists and planned a series of
radio and television programs on law and legal rights. Occasionally,
it has resorted to the communications media to develop public support
in behalf of the causes of particular clients.
In two prominent cases, the Institute provided legal representation
for poor occupants of land required for government development
projects. The first project was undertaken to implement a plan that
called for the clearance of older communities for replacement by
modern housing and industrial centers. A government contractor with
strong political influence was assigned to demolish the village of
Simprug, on the outskirts of Jakarta. The contractor arrived at the site
accompanied by bulldozers and armed men to intimidate the villagers
who owned the land. Nasution organized and encouraged the villagers
to resist clearance, prepared pamphlets explaining that the threatened
eviction was contrary to law, posted notices advising the contractor not
to enter the property, and invited the press to witness the events.
Rather than commence litigation he successfully negotiated with the
contractor and the government. A written agreement providing fair
compensation for the villagers' land and property in an amount roughly
equivalent to U.S. $1 million was concluded.
The second case arose when, in order to establish a greenbelt in ac-
cordance with the Jakarta development plan, the government sought
to clear a settlement, known as Tebet, of about five thousand families.
Unlike the landowners of Simprug, the inhabitants of Tebet were
squatters who had occupied public land for thirteen years. Therefore,
they had no legal grounds upon which to resist eviction or claim com-
pensation. The government issued several warnings and deadlines for
voluntary removal; when these went unheeded, clearance operations
began. The people fruitlessly sent delegations to petition the gov-
32. LEGAL AID AND WORLD POVERTY 192.
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ernor, the provincial parliament, and the dominant political party.
Having heard about the Simprug case, the squatters then asked
Nasution to represent them. He explained that as squatters they had
no right to compensation, but agreed to ask the government to provide
a relocation site. Again enlisting the support of the press, Nasution
argued that if a relocation site were not provided, the people would
have no choice but to resume squatting elsewhere. The government
agreed to provide a site about five miles away. It is not known whether
the relocation site will offer sufficient urban services and access to em-
ployment opportunities to enable the former Tebet villagers to establish
a permanent settlement.
In January 1974, Nasution was arrested following the riots in Jakarta
precipitated by the visit of the Prime Minister of Japan. At the time
of this writing, he remains under detention, awaiting trial on charges
of subversion. It is unknown whether Nasution's tactics as Director
of the Legal Aid Institute contributed to his arrest, but it seems reason-
able to speculate that his incarceration will discourage the use of such
tactics in the future.
B. Singapore
Singapore, with a population of approximately 2.2 million, has fewer
than 300 lawyers.33  Though parliamentary in form, the government
is dominated by the elite leadership of the highly disciplined People's
Action Party and an able, determined, and pragmatic administration.A
Although communists and pro-communists are subject to systematic
repression, elections are free and regularly conducted. Organized
opposition is weak, and dissent is tolerated only when the administra-
tion does not perceive it as a threat to the tight political and social
order. The legal profession appears to be well organized and conven-
tional in outlook.
Broad statutory provisions for legal representation of indigent de-
fendants and litigants in criminal and civil cases have received only
33. Id. at 172.
34. On the politics and economy of Singapore, see generally T. BELLOWS, THe
PEOPLE'S AcTION PARTY OF SINGAPORE: EMERGENCE OF A DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM
(1970); MODEN SINGAPORE (J. Ooi & H. Chiang, eds. 1969); C. PANo, SINGAPORE'S
PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (1971); L Sharp, Social Attitudes: Pragmatism Versus
Hypocrisy, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 9, 1974, at Supp. 20 [Focus. Singapore in Asia
'74]; sources cited note 7 supra.
[Vol. 1975:45
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/9
LAW, URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE POOR
token implementation. In the late 1950's, the government established
a Legal Aid Society, staffed by the government's legal and judicial ser-
vice. The Society appears to function within the limits of a traditional
legal aid perspective. A recent evaluation of legal aid in Singapore
concluded:
It appears that members of the Singapore Bar are, on the whole, disin-
clined to enroll themselves on the panel and this includes the younger
members of the profession. The probability is that they do not feel
that legal aid is part of the pattern of their professional life; it is a sys-
tem run by a Government department along lines which offer neither
"incentive nor challenge". 35
As a result of its favorable geographical location, political stability,
and effective planning, which has built upon the City's traditional entre-
p6t role and labor-intensive export manufacturing, Singapore has enjoy-
ed one of the world's highest economic growth rates in recent years.
The successive impacts of "confrontation" with Indonesia, separation
from Malaysia, and withdrawal of British military forces have been
absorbed, and the high level of unemployment prevailing at the begin-
ning of the 1960's has been significantly reduced. Gains in literacy,
education, and health have accompanied economic prosperity. An
aggressive program of urban development has produced a modern
central business district, a successful industrial estate and satellite town,
extensive slum clearance, and massive public housing complexes, which
now house nearly half of the population of the island.
Singapore's urban development law embodies a powerful array of
planning controls, without significant legal checks upon their exerciseY6
Although often ignored by government, the Master Plan is legally sanc-
tioned. Planning permission is required to develop or materially change
the use of private land. A development charge may be exacted from de-
velopers proposing to develop land more intensively than indicated by
the Master Plan, which clearly provides for outdated and unrealistically
35. Hilbourne, The Quality of Legal Aid in Singapore, [19691 MALAYAN LJ. at
xliv.
36. See generally SINGAPORE HousiNG DEVELOPMENT BoARD, HoMS FOR THE
PEOPLE: 50,000 Up, A REVIEW OF PUBLIc HOUSING (1965); 1.H. Tan, Urbanization
Planning and National Development Planning in Singapore, Jan. 1972 (unpublished
paper for SEADAG seminar in Manila); Koh & Lin, Planning Law and Processes in
Singapore, 11 MALAYA L. REv. 315 (1969); Koh, supra notes 25 & 26; Tan, Metropoli-
tan Planning in Singapore, AusTL. PLAN. J., Oct. 1966, at 111-19. The following account
is based upon J. Magavern, Urban Planning Law in Singapore, 1971 (unpublished paper
for SEADAG) without indication of direct quotations.
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low densities. As an incentive to desired kinds of development, the
development charge may be waived. Real property taxes are levied
at very high rates, but may be abated as an incentive to devel-
opment. Most property in the central city is subject to a stringent
rent control statute, which bars eviction of tenants for redevelop-
ment of the property. The planning authorities, however, are em-
powered to designate particular areas in which property may be
released from rent control for redevelopment in accordance with an
approved plan, on the condition that the owner compensate his tenants
in an amount fixed by an administrative tribunal. To secure develop-
ment, either public or private, land can be acquired by expropriation,
without limitation by any doctrine of public use. Just compensation
is not constitutionally guaranteed, and the statutory measure of com-
pensation may in some cases provide only a fraction of the market value
of the land taken in compulsory acquisition proceedings.
Although neither substantive standards nor procedural safeguards
present significant checks on arbitrary, oppressive, and abusive applica-
tion of these powers, there has been little controversy over their
exercise. This may be explained in part by the sequence of evolution
of the planning controls. 7 The foundation of the present structure of
planning law exists in the statutory system of rent control enacted by
the British colonial regime as an emergency measure at the outset of
World War II. After the war, when redevelopment of existing urban
areas was severely restricted by rent control, planning controls were
established. These were based upon a Master Plan that contemplated
both redevelopment and expansion of the urban area at what proved
to be insufficient densities. Several years later, a development charge
was imposed for development at the higher density levels recognized
to be necessary, but not provided for by the Master Plan. Then the gov-
ernment was authorized to expropriate devastated land at its value as
encumbered by occupancy under rent control and by planning restric-
tions on intensity of development. Finally, the rent control statute was
amended to permit redevelopment pursuant to special permission and
with compensation to tenants. In effect, rent control very nearly
amounted to an expropriation of development rights in land occupied
by tenants, and the imposition of planning control amounted to an ex-
propriation of a considerable portion of the remaining development
rights. Thereafter, the development charge, land acquisition act, and
37. For further details, see J. Magavern, supra note 36.
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the decontrol amendments all treated landowners as already having
been deprived of these rights, although at no time had they been com-
pensated for them.
The logic of this sequence in the development of land use planning
powers may explain why the process went so smoothly. But, of course,
there must be more substantive reasons. Some of these are obvious.
Singapore is a prosperous, well-located city-state of 225 square miles,
2.2 million people, and one level of government. It has not had to
contend with a powerful, agricultural landowning class striving to pro-
tect entrenched property rights. Before 1959, Singapore was ruled by
an authoritarian colonial government, and since 1959 it has been ruled
by a tightly disciplined administration that quickly and shrewdly
developed overwhelming political power. Although it can no longer
be characterized as such, the administration came into power as a leftist
party, based on labor union and pro-communist support. The govern-
ment has relied upon and supported the dedicated and highly compe-
tent senior officials of the professional civil service. Corruption has
been practically eliminated. The Minister of Law and National
Development has not abused the vast discretionary powers vested in
his office. He has exercised these powers mainly through the promul-
gation of general rules. For example, development charges and
density policies have been determined in terms of planning criteria of
general application. Finally, the government has been highly success-
ful in providing housing and employment to a large part of the popula-
tion.
While Singapore's urban development laws and policies have been
administered effectively and have benefited a majority of the people,
the immediate impact upon the poor has been distinctly unfavorable.3
To provide land for urban development projects, the government has
razed squatter settlements and densely inhabited neighborhoods of old
shop houses, thereby driving residents from low-cost housing, disrupt-
ing their community-based economic and social relationships, and
impairing their earning capacity in such occupations as hawking, small-
scale shopkeeping, and the raising of poultry, hogs, and vegetables.
Although the government provides compensation and relocation oppor-
tunities to squatters, and stalls in the markets of new housing complexes
to former street hawkers, public housing is estimated to be beyond the
38. See sources cited note 7 supra.
Vol. 1975:45]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
means of the poorest twenty-five percent of the population, who live in
squatter settlements and extremely overcrowded old shop houses. For
those who resettle in public housing, the result can be an increase in
housing costs of from 5 to 18.7 percent of their total budget.8"
* The priorities reflected in urban development policy and the role of
law and lawyers in making and implementing it are illustrated by the
enactment of a statute permitting property to be released from rent
control for the purpose of redevelopment.40 In the late 1960's, the
government came to see rent control as an obstacle to redevelopment
of the old central city. Consequently, it proposed a bill to allow
property to be released from rent control for redevelopment pursuant
to an approved plan. The bill required the owner to compensate his
tenants and established a Tenants Compensation Board to decide dis-
putes about what properties should be released from control and the
amount of compensation required. The draft bill was referred to a
select committee to conduct hearings and make recommendations for
revision before final consideration in Parliament. The committee was
made up of eight members including the Minister for Law and National
Development who served as chairman. Thirty-seven persons and groups
presented written statements and testimony to the committee. Among the
groups represented was the Advocates and Solicitors Society. The Society
urged that proceedings before the Tenants Compensation Board be
considered judicial in character, and, accordingly, that only advocates
and solicitors be allowed to practice before the Board. In addition, the
Society recommended that the presiding officer be a qualified legal
officer, and that decisions of the Board be subject to judicial review.
The select committee accepted all three recommendations, with the ex-
ception that judicial review of compensation awards was expressly pre-
cluded.
Two issues of particular significance to the poor were considered by
the select committee: the measure of, and eligibility for, compensation.
The bill established minimum levels of compensation based upon multi-'
ples of existing rents and, as noted above, created a Tenants Compen-
sation Board to fix compensation when the owner and tenants could
not agree. This approach to compensation, based upon a multiple
of existing, controlled rent, leads to the anomalous result that compen-
39- I. BUCHANAN, supra note 7, at 242.
40. For details, see J. Magavem, supra note 36.
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sation varies inversely with the economic injury suffered by reason of
eviction. While injury increases to the extent controlled rent is lower
than economic rent, compensation is reduced. Moreover, to the extent
that rents generally vary with income, less affluent tenants receive less
compensation than the more affluent.
The issue of eligibility for compensation was of greater significance
to the poor. The bill limited compensation to legal tenants and sub-
tenants, a relatively affluent class as compared to licensees, squatters,
and bed space renters, who were excluded from compensation.
The Advocates and Solicitors Society raised no objection to the com-
pensation provisions, although its representative did observe that the
minimum levels provided by the bill were "far too small." The Legal
Aid Society did not appear in the hearings. The most carefully
prepared objection to the compensation scheme was presented by the
Singapore Planning and Urban Research Group (SPUR), a small
organization of architects and other persons interested in urban plan-
ning, including a former Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University
of Singapore.4 SPUR proposed that the compensation schedule be in-
versely related to the income of the occupant and that eligibility for
compensation be broadened to include licensees and squatters. The
select committee rejected SPUR's proposals and recommended reten-
tion of the bill's original provisions. The committee's objective was to
devise a simple formula roughly approximating the existing private
"market" rates of compensation. Such a formula would not greatly
alter the economic positions of the parties and would encourage com-
pensation agreements without recourse to the Board. By confirming
expectations developed during three decades of rent control, the bill
embodied a property-centered resolution of the issue of compensation.
After the bill was enacted into law, the Legal Aid Society appeared
in the first case heard by the Tenants Compensation Board.4 2 The
early cases were expected to serve as tests of the Board's attitude about
compensation rates, and thus to establish a basis for voluntary settle-
ment of future disputes. In the first case, however, a Legal Aid lawyer
41. T.T.B. Koh, who was then serving as Singapore's permanent representative to
the United Nations.
42. The following text is based upon S.Y. Tan, A Critique of Overseas-Chinese
Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Chew Lian Mee and Others, 1971 (unpublished paper sub-
mitted to SEADAG and the transcript of those cases, Tenants' Compensation Board
Application No. 1 of 1970.
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appearing for a group of subtenants raised no objection to the release
of the property from rent control. On the issue of compensation he
presented no evidence, brief, or detailed argument, but simply asked
for favorable consideration of his clients' cases. The Board's decision
was unfavorable to the tenants; it awarded compensation only slightly
higher than the minimum level prescribed by the statute. It is unclear
whether a more aggressive approach would have been more effective.
The point is simply that in neither the proceedings of the select com-
mittee nor the important first case brought under the new act did the
Legal Aid Society effectively advocate the interests of the poor.
Although the urban development policies of Singapore have been
unfavorable to the immediate environmental interests of the poor, other
factors must be taken into account. Singapore has been and remains
under considerable geopolitical stress, and consequently requires a
strong and stable government and rapid economic development. It
may be that in the long run the poor will benefit most from policies
that defer attention to their interests in the short run. That, however,
is not the kind of judgment that can be made by a professional advo-
cate, nor one within the scope of this Article. The primary question
here is not what is the best national policy, but rather what is and what
can be the role of legal services to the poor in urban development
policy.
C. South Korea
Traditional Korean culture and politics were strongly antilegal in
character.4" Cultural values emphasized hierarchy, harmony, and
accommodation. Political power was highly centralized, unchecked
and unbalanced by strong local, religious, or economic institutions.
The dictatorial legal order of the Japanese regime of the early 20th
century was fiercely resented by Koreans and aroused a strong
antipathy to legal institutions. During the post-World War II period,
Korea has undergone extremely rapid social change.44 Postwar politi-
cal experience has been characterized by a continuing tension between
autocracy and constitutionalism, with cyclical shifts in either direction.
The political system suffers from inadequate development of politi-
43. See P. HAimi, THE KoREAN PoLITIcAL TRADITION AND LAw (1967); G. HENDER-
SON, KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEX (1968).
44. See G. HENDERSON, supra note 43; H. LEE, KoREA: TIME, CHANGE AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION (1968).
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cal parties as independent and stablizing institutions. The press, the
churches, the bar, and the students and universities have supported
constitutionalism against autocratic tendencies, however. The legisla-
tive branch has provided a measure of popular participation and an
appreciable, if weak, check on centralized executive power. The
judiciary has grown somewhat more independent. On several occa-
sions these developing institutions, strengthened by considerable popular
adherence to the ideals of constitutional democracy, have restrained the
executive branch from entirely subverting the constitution .4  Re-
cently, however, the administration was able to push through a sweep-
ing set of constitutional amendments that concentrated authority in the
presidency, undermined the independence of the judicial and legisla-
tive branches, and drastically impaired constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression and political organization. The constitutional
amendments and the repressive actions thereafter taken by the govern-
ment have given rise to considerable political tension. Although it is
impossible to predict confidently the course of political developments,
it is not unreasonable to expect that a modified form of constitutional
democracy will eventually take firm hold in South Korea. While the
formal legal institutions have remained weak, urbanization, education,
economic development, and democratic ideals appear to be generating
pressures for their development. 46
There are now in South Korea fewer than one thousand practicing
lawyers to serve a population of more than thirty million. 47 Many Korean
law schools were established in the proliferation of private universities
after the conclusion of World War II, and they have produced thousands
of law graduates. Only a small number of these, however, have passed
the bar examination and been admitted to practice.
Despite provisions for the assignment of counsel in the Codes of
Criminal and Civil Procedure, very few indigent defendants and liti-
gants have had representation in court. In the 1960's, Korea's only
woman lawyer, the Dean of the College of Law and Political Science
of Ewha Woman's University, founded a Legal Aid Center for Family
Relations. The Center is modestly funded by private charity and a
45. See D. COLE & P. LYMAN, KOREAN DEvELOPMENT: THE INTERPLAY OF
POLMCS AND DEVELOPMENT (1971); J. OH, KOREA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1968); T.
Kwon & J. Magavem, Legal Change in Korea: Expropriation Law and Practice, 1973
(unpublished paper sponsored by Int'l Liaison Committee for Research on Korea).
46. See T. Kwon & J. Magavern, supra note 45.
47. LEGAL Am AND WoRLD PovRTY 202.
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small annual contribution from the government. As its name suggests,
the Center takes only domestic relations cases. Also in the 1960's the
First Bar Association of Seoul created the Korean Legal Aid Associa-
tion. The Association assigns cases to its members on a rotating basis.
It handles only fifty to sixty cases a year, most of which are claims for
personal injuries. In 1972, on the direct initiative of President Park,
the Korean government established a Legal Aid Foundation and provid-
ed it with substantial financial support. In the first six months of its ex-
istence, the Foundation received 1800 applications for counseling. It re-
ceived 562 and accepted 248 applications for legal representation in liti-
gated matters. The great majority of those cases concerned torts and
workmen's injuries, wages claims, and debts. The Foundation is ex-
pressly prohibited from handling administrative matters and claims
against the government. The poor, therefore, have to look elsewhere
for legal assistance in matters involving opposition to official urban de-
velopment actions.48
Since World War II, South Korea has achieved rising levels of health,
education, and welfare. The literacy rate is now approaching 90%.
A ,sweeping program of rural land reform was successfully imple-
mented in the late 1940's. In the 1960's, after a period of political
instability- and economic stagnation following recovery from the dev-
astation of the Korean War, the Park administration established
political stability and instituted economic policies and incentives de-
signed to promote capital formation, foreign investment, exports, and la-
bor-intensive manufacturing. 49 The results have been remarkable. The
annual gross national product per capita has now risen to U.S. $400-
500. Although this economic growth has brought widening rural-
urban income disparities, it has been generally equitable in other
respects. 50 By 1970 unemployment was reduced to 4.5 percent, and
real wages were rising at the annual rate of 20 percent in the man-
ufacturing sector and 12 percent in agriculture.
In the meantime the largest cities were growing at explosive rates,
with little infrastructure development and less planning. In the latter
half of the 1960's the government began to give attention to problems
of urban development. The president appointed new mayors for the
48. Id. at 202-03.
49. See D. COLE & P. LymAN, supra note 45.
50. See Adelman, Strategies for Equitable Growth, CHALLENGE, May-June 1974, at
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three largest cities. The new mayor of Seoul, who quickly became
known as "Bulldozer Kim," initiated a massive public works program
of 800 projects, costing $87 million in 1966-67 and generating 2.9
million man-days of employment in 1966."' The Seoul development
program engendered considerable conflict both within the government
and between the government and owners and occupants of land
required for public use. The city's planning, land acquisition, and
development practices were designed almost exclusively, to achieve
concrete, short-term results. This produced speedy project execution
and a pronounced disregard for planning standards, legal procedures,
and social impact. Owners and tenants were intimidated and inade-
quately compensated for property taken for public use. Squatter
settlements on land required for public works projects were cleared
summarily.
On several occasions, however, land owners petitioned, demon-
strated, and retained lawyers to bring legal action against illegal and
coercive tactics employed by the government. 52 As a consequence, the
government moderated its tactics considerably and ceased its open defi-
ance of the law. It continues, however, to employ such high-pressure
tactics as dispatching highly visible demolition squads into a neighbbr-
hood before beginning negotiations for land acquisition.
As a small but growing number of land owners began to retain law-
yers to challenge the level of the compensation offered by administra-
tive officials, the courts demonstrated increasing willingness to require
more adequate compensation. Thus far, however, only a small number
of sophisticated and relatively affluent land owners have been able to
employ private lawyers. Poorer land owners have continued without
protest to accept grossly inadequate compensation.
Squatters, as well as landowners, resisted summary clearance for ur-
ban development projects, although the squatters had no recourse to
judicial proceedings.53 On a number of occasions, groups of squatters
demonstrated and petitioned the government to abandon or defer
projects or to provide more favorable relocation opportunities. In a
51. D. COLE & P. LYMAN, supra note 45, at 226-27.
52. See T. Kwon & J. Magavern, supra note 45.
53. See S. Choe, A Study of the Ability of the Legal System to Facilitate Urban
Renewal in Korea, 1972 (unpublished paper for SEADAG Project No. 70101); Kwon,
An Evaluation of the Capacity of Law to Facilitate Urban Development: The Case
of Kwangju Squatters Resettlement Program, 10 KOREA J. PuB. AD. 130-65 (1972).
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few instances they were at least partially successful, particularly in get-
ting clearance programs deferred during election campaigns. As the
"squatter problem" gained public attention, the city of Seoul in 1967
initiated a set of three programs; (1) "legalization" of 46,000 squatter
housing units; (2) on-site construction of new apartment buildings to
replace 14,000 units; and (3) clearance of 76,650 units and relocation
of the occupants to a new town. The program of legalization was
soon dropped when the target areas were inundated with new squatters
seeking a legal foothold in the city. More than 400 apartment build-
ings were built in two years under the second program. The city ran
out of suitable land for the apartment projects, however, and encoun-
tered difficulty in obtaining additional public or private land. Also,
complaints were voiced about the location, quality of design, and con-
struction standards of the buildings. In early 1970, one of the apart-
ment buildings collapsed, causing thirty-three deaths and many injuries.
In the ensuing scandal, Mayor Kim resigned from office. It was later
found that only about 50% of the squatters who had been assigned
apartment units still occupied them. The others had either sublet or
sold their rights of occupancy.
The most ambitious of Seoul's urban development projects was the
new town that was planned for construction outside the city in the vil-
lage of Kwangju.5" The plan for the Kwangju New Town project was
formally submitted by the city government to the Central City Planning
Committee of the Ministry of Construction in the spring of 1968. The
planned population of the new town was 350,000, to be achieved by
a five-year settlement program during the years 1969-1973. Approxi-
mately eighty percent of the proposed population was to be composed
of squatters relocated from Seoul. The balance were to be voluntary
settlers attracted to the new town. A large scale industrial estate was
to provide employment for at least one member of sixty percent of the
families. The financial program, which was expected to make the
project self-liquidating, called for public expenditures of 9.3 billion
Won55 largely raised by the sale of land in the new town.
Serious difficulties were encountered in developing the new town.
Initially, squatters were relocated without adequate shelter, urban serv-
ices, employment opportunities, or transportation to Seoul. Large
54. This account is based on Kwon, supra note 53.
55. At that time the official rate of exchange was W 270 to US $1.
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numbers of voluntary settlers began to arrive in quest of land. Many
squatters illegally sold the land allotted to them to voluntary settlers
or speculators and moved back to Seoul. The city had originally pur-
chased only about one-third of the area of the new town. As specula-
tion took hold, land prices rose rapidly; the result was that the govern-
ment was unable to purchase additional land at its agricultural value,
as had been planned. Farmers who had sold land to the government
at agricultural values now saw former farmland being bought and sold
at greatly inflated prices. Also, while the government awarded land
to relocated squatters at subsidized prices, it charged voluntary settlers
the full market value. Discontent over disparities in land prices, es-
pecially on the part of voluntary settlers, led to demonstrations and
a riot in the new town. In response, the government agreed to make
land available to voluntary settlers at the same prices offered to relo-
cated squatters. The financial program for the project was based upon
the purchase and resale of land, however. When the city had to pay
more than planned for undeveloped land and sell developed land for
less than planned, its financial program was disrupted, and development
stalled. Consequently, it became impossible to accommodate all of the
squatters to be relocated from Seoul.
Although the plan broke down and its original goals were achieved
only in part, the project must nevertheless be considered a qualified
success. The new town is now a prosperous and bustling community
of approximately 250,000 people, about half of whom are former
squatters. Industries have been established and urban services and
adequate transportation to Seoul have been provided. The community
has been established as an independent municipal government and is
continuing to grow. The Kwangju new town project demonstrates both
the difficulties of executing a sites-and-services project, even when car-
ried out by a highly effective government, and the value of even an
imperfectly executed project.
Even before the massive urban development program of the late
1960's was undertaken, a rather comprehensive set of urban planning
and land expropriation laws could be found on the statute books, but
the laws had never been thoroughly implemented and tested. As the
government proceeded with its program, it discovered a number of in-
adequacies in these laws. A principal difficulty was the government's
inability to control development and appreciation in the value of the
land it wished to allocate to urban development or acquire for public
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use. Consequently, in the early 1970's the government enacted an
array of amendments and new laws authorizing the imposition of highly
restrictive controls on the use of land classified for agricultural or other
low-intensity uses. A freeze was placed on the price and further private
development of land designated for future public use or for urban or in-
dustrial development.5 "
In the last several years, the Korean government has attempted, with
considerable success, to restrict the proliferation of squatter settlements
and the overall growth of the large cities.57 It has undertaken an ag-
gressive regional development program, which calls for five new urban
industrial centers, with a projected total work force of two million.
Stringent land use controls have been imposed in and around the large
cities. In 1970, the president decided that circumferential greenbelts
should be established around the largest cities, and the City Planning
Law was amended to implement that policy. The amended law pro-
hibits practically any development in designated greenbelts. There is no
compensation for land owners. The law is enforced strictly. A green-
belt designated around the developed area of Seoul is kept under con-
stant surveillance by helicopters; any attempt to construct new dwellings
is promptly blocked. A district chief who allows construction of an il-
legal dwelling in his district is subject to the immediate loss of his job.
By using strict and vigilant police measures, Seoul has been one of the
few large cities in a developing country to have halted the development
of squatter colonies around the urban periphery.
Seours effective control of squatting and peripheral urban expan-
sion, together with the continued clearance of existing squatter settle-
ments, appears to have had a seriously adverse impact upon the poor.
Despite a fifty percent tax on speculative gains, land prices in the central
city have been driven up rapidly, pricing the poor out of the market.
It has been estimated that, while the number of squatter dwellings in
Seoul has been reduced from 180,000 to 120,000 the number of
squatters has remained the same.58 The effect of government poli-
cies is the further overcrowding of the poor in a decreasing number of
56. See T. Kwon, Changing Patterns of Planning Law in Korea, 1974 (to be pub-
lished by the East-West Center, Honolulu); T. Kwon & J. Magavern, supra note 45.
57. The following discussion is based on J. Magavern, Report to Korean Housing
Policy Task Force, Aug. 3, 1974 (unpublished).
58. Interview with Professor Chung-Hyun Ro, at Yonsei University, Seoul, South
Korea, Aug. 1974.
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dwellings in the central city and longer and more expensive transporta-
tion for commuters living outside the greenbelt.
A recent incident arising from a campaign to organize the poor to
oppose urban development actions of the government illustrated the
limits of that approach where governmental and police power is highly
centralized and relatively unrestrained by effective legal and
political institutions. 9 A leading clergyman, the Rev. Pak Hyong Kyu,
pastor of Seoul's First Presbyterian Church, headed a community action
committee that undertook to organize the residents of Seoul's slum
neighborhoods. The committee's organizing efforts initially met with
some success. When the city administration ordered the clearance of
the Songjong Dong squatter settlement to make way for construction
of a subway, the Rev. Pak's committee organized a protest by the resi-
dents, who petitioned President Park for compensation. As a result
of the protest, a community leader was reportedly arrested, beaten,
and directed not to organize further petition campaigns. Several
weeks later, the Rev. Pak and a number of his followers were arrested
on charges of subversion. The charge against the Rev. Pak was based
not upon his community organization activities, but upon another inci-
dent in which his followers had distributed leaflets calling for a "revival
of democracy" at an Easter sunrise service. (Martial law had been de-
clared and a new constitution adopted at the end of the previous year.)
This charge, however, did not explain the fact that among those of his
followers arrested was the chief organizer of the Songiong Dong resi-
dents, who was not involved in the sunrise service. Observers con-
cluded that the arrests were motivated by the community organization
activities of the Rev. Pak's group. Pak was convicted and sentenced
to two years imprisonment. The court explained that the sentence was
limited to two years, instead of the minimum term of three years pro-
vided by the law under which he was charged, "in view of Rev. Pak's
Christian faith." The effect of the arrest of Pak and his associates was
to bring their community organization program to a halt.
In sum, South Korea has developed rapidly under a powerful, cen-
tralized government. Economic planning has met with outstanding
success and has promoted rapid and generally equitable growth. All
but the very poorest sectors of society have enjoyed rising levels of
59. This account is based on reports in FAR E. EcoN. REV., July 16, 1973, at 16;
id., Oct. 1, 1973, at 17.
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employment and income. Urban planning has been relatively effec-
tive, compared to most other countries. As legal difficulties have been
encountered, the government has enacted laws reflecting a technocratic
perspective, as exemplified in the imposition of strict land use controls.
The legal profession is small in number, and lawyers have played little
part in development issues. Private attorneys representing a small but
growing number of affluent and confident landowners have initiated
judicial proceedings to restrain blatant disregard for the law in the ac-
quisition of land for public works. Legal aid organizations have not
been concerned with issues of urban development. The government-
sponsored Legal Aid Foundation is not permitted to act in administra-
tive proceedings, or in claims against the government. Church and
community social action groups have been suppressed when they have
aggressively attempted to organize and represent the poor in opposi-
tion to official urban development actions.
D. The Philippines
1. The Social Context of the Philippine Legal System
Every country manifests some degree of legal dualism reflecting
a tension between the formal legal order and a traditional social order
based upon informal norms and practices in which loyalty is owed to
the person, family, or group. This dualism is relatively strong in
countries that have experienced the imposition of an alien legal system
by a colonial regime. Despite the persistence of such dualism, and
perhaps reflecting it in part, the formal legal system has played an im-
portant role in Philippine society for many years by representing imper-
fectly realized policies of the central government and by providing a
structure in which the government is limited and its policies are con-
fronted, reshaped, and often frustrated by a society that is highly plur-
alistic and inadequately integrated at the national level.60  For several
60. These are matters of degree and relative emphasis, and oversimplification is ad-
mittedly unavoidable in a discussion of this kind. For an excellent survey of the formal
Philippine legal system, see Pascual, The Philippines, in LAwAsI LEGAL SYSTEMS (V.
Venturini ed. 1970). On Philippine politics, see R. AoPALo, THE POLrICAL ELITE AND
Tm PEOPLE: A STUDY OF POLITIcS IN OCCIDENTAL MINDORO (1972); 0. Coluz, Tnu
PHILIPPINEs (1965); J. GRossHoLTz, POLITICS IN THE Pf-lLIPPINES (1964); M. HOLLN-
STEINER, THE DYNAMICS OF POWER IN A PHILIPPINE MUNICIPALITY (1963); C. LANDE
THE STRUCTURE OF PHILIPPINE PoLrIcs (1964); A. LAQUTAN, THE CITY IN NATIONAL-
BUILDING (1966); B. VILLANEuVA, P. VILLANuEVA, E. PEREZ, C. CuENTo & J. PUA,
GOVERNMENT AND ADMrNSTRATION OF A MUNI IPALrT (1966).
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hundred years, under Spanish, American, and Japanese rule, the for-
mal legal system represented an imposed colonial regime, never fully
accepted and at times actively resisted by the people." In addition,
Filipino culture embodies certain antilegal characteristics, such as re-
spect for hierarchy and authority, emphasis upon harmonious social re-
lationships, strong identification with family and personal groups, and
paternalism in tenancy, economic, and political relationships.6 Never-
theless, certain historical and political conditions have tended to place
great importance upon law. The ideology of liberal democracy played
an important part in the Filipino revolution against the Spanish colonial
government.6 3  After the American takeover, which was effected by
military suppression of the revolutionary movement, independent
legislative and judicial institutions were established, and specifically
American concepts of government and constitutional law were incorpo-
rated in the legal system. As the struggle for independence shifted
to legal and political channels, 64 and, as the institutions of government
were occupied by Filipinos, law and lawyers assumed a role in politics
and government comparable in many ways to their role in the United
States. After independence, their role in the political process became
even more pronounced. The colonial rulers established an alliance
with the Filipino landowning elite, who have continued to rely on the
constitution and legal structure to protect their property rights and posi-
tion of economic and political dominance. The weakness of nongov-
ernmental social organizations of national scope and the domin-
ance of small group relations render the political system heavily de-
pendent upon law to express and implement national values and to re-
solve factional disputes. Thus, the rule of law is both emphasized and
partially negated by the tension between national government and tra-
ditional society.
61. See T. AGONCILLO, TAE FATEFUL YEARS: JAPAN'S ADVENTURE IN THE PHILIP-
PINES, 1941-45 (1965); 0. CoRPuz, THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHLIPPINES (1957); 0.
CoRpuz, supra note 60; J. LARKIN, THE PAMPANGANS: COLONIAL SOCIETY IN A PHILIP-
PINES PROVINCE (1972); J. PHELAN, THE HISPANIZATION OF THE PHILPPINES (1959);
E. RoBLEs, THE PHILIPPINES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1969).
62. See sources cited notes 60 & 61 supra.
63. See T. AGoNCILLo, MALOLoS: THE CRIsis oF THm REPUBLIC (1960); T.
AGONCILLO, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES: THE STORY OF BONIFACIO AND THE
KATIPUNAN (1956); C. MAJUL, MABINI AND THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1960); C.
MAJUL, THE POLiTICAL AND CoNSTrunONAL IDEAS OF THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION
(1957).
64. See T. FRIEND, BErwEEN Two EbpEms: THE ORDEAL OF TIE PHILipPNms
1929-1946 (1965).
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Until martial law was declared in September 1972, elections were
conducted regularly in the Philippines. Though marred by localized
violence, vote-buying, and fraud, the elections were openly and vigor-
ously contested and resulted in frequent changes of administration.
The two major political parties were ideologically indistinguishable and
represented shifting alliances of regional and local organizations based
upon patronage and loyalty to particular leaders and families. 5 The
press was free and outspoken. The supreme court was untouched by
scandal, enjoyed great prestige, and did not hesitate to strike down
executive and legislative action it considered unconstitutional or other-
wise unlawful. Although the lower courts were clogged with cases and
occasionally involved in favoritism and corruption, they were, on the
whole, independent and respected. Congress and local legislative
bodies passed laws, initiated programs, and created agencies to deal
with every significant public problem. Only rarely, however, was suf-
ficient attention given to problems of financing and implementation.
The bureaucracy received neither the financial nor the political support
necessary for effective implementation of economic development and
social reform programs; to the contrary, the bureaucracy was subjected
to debilitating political interference in behalf of special interests of all
kinds.
Thus, while the Philippines has achieved high standards of health,
education and literacy, economic growth and social reform have been
less satisfactory."" Following rapid recovery from the destruction of
World War II, heavily protective economic policies were adopted to
promote import substitution. Light industry sprang up in the Manila
region, and a class of Filipino entrepreneurs emerged. Those policies
outlived their usefulness within a few years, however, and a period of
relative stagnation followed. A succession of planning and develop-
ment agencies was created with broad and ambitious purposes and
functions, but without the necessary political and financial support or
coherent organization of overlapping and conflicting roles.07 Economic
65. See sources cited note 60 supra.
66. See F. GOLAY, THE PHILIPPINES: PUBLIC POLICY AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT (1968 ed.); G. SiCAT, ECONOMIC POLICY AND PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(1972).
67. See Magavern Physical Planning Law in the Philippines: The Need for Legis-
lation, 43 PiM. L.J 571 (1968); Roxas, Lessons from Philippine Experience in Develop-
mental Planning, 4 PHIL. EoN. J. 35 (1965), A. Santiago & J. Magavern, supra note
11.
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planning was vitiated by political expediency and subservience to spe-
cial interests. Public resources were dissipated.
In the late 1960's, planning was strengthened considerably, particu-
larly in respect to project identification, programming, and execution.
Incentives were shifted to favor exports. Several substantial mining
ventures were initiated. It is still too early to predict the success of
this reorientation of planning and policy. In the last two years, infla-
tion has impaired the standards of living of the urban poor and middle
classes, but rising commodity prices have resulted in record export
earnings and probably in rising incomes in the rural sector.
Population has grown at annual rates well above three percent. In
the past, sufficient land was available to support a growing population
without rapid structural change. In the last generation, however, al-
most all remaining arable land has been brought under cultivation.
Despite a vigorous campaign to raise agricultural productivity, disguised
unemployment and underemployment remain high in the countryside.
Major land reform laws were enacted in 1955 and 1963, but until the
declaration of martial law in 1972, little effort was made to implement
them, and agrarian tenancy continued to increase. The martial law
government has accelerated land reform programs, but it is too early
to assess the results.
2. Legal Aid in the Philippines
The Philippines does not suffer from a scarcity of lawyers. In 1960
the country had 27,500 lawyers, or approximately 1,000 lawyers per
million population, as compared to 1,500 in the United States, 70 in
Japan, and 200 to 1,000 in most of the countries of Western Europe., s
The number of lawyers in the Philippines does not reflect a correspond-
ingly high demand for legal services; many are employed as clerks
in government and corporate offices. Nevertheless, the title of attor-
ney is highly respected. 69 The many private and proprietary universi-
ties are able to provide legal education at a very low cost.
At the outset of American colonial rule in the Philippines, certain
doctrines of American constitutional law were incorporated in the
68. Galanter, Introduction: The Study of the Indian Legal Profession, 3 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 201, 204 (1968).
69. In a survey of high school seniors, the occupation of lawyer ranked third in
prestige, below doctor and college professor and above priest and corporation executive.
Castillo, Occupation Evaluation in the Philippines, 10 PmL. Soc. Rv. 147 (1962).
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Philippine legal system.70 The organic laws of the colonial regime con-
tained due process and equal protection clauses and assured the
criminal defendant's right to counsel.71 The code of criminal pro-
cedure required the court to advise the defendant of his right to coun-
sel and to appoint counsel for him if he had none.72  Failure of the
court to observe this duty was held to violate the defendant's right to
due process of law. 3
In 1935, a Philippine constitution was adopted, providing for na-
tional independence following a ten-year transitional period as a Com-
monwealth of the United States. 74  The 1935 constitution contained
due process and equal protection clauses and the specific provision that:
"Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason
of poverty."7 5  The same clause is contained in the current constitu-
tion.7 6 Pursuant to constitutional authorization, the supreme court pro-
mulgated Rules of Court embodying rules of procedure for the judicial
system. The rules provide for the right to counsel at every stage of
criminal proceedings and require the court to advise the defendant of his
right to counsel and to assign him an attorney de officio if he is unable
to afford counsel. 7 In 1962, the court amended the rules to provide
70. The authors wish to thank Professor Asteya M. Santiago of the University of
the Philippines, who graciously assembled the materials upon which the following ac-
count of legal aid in the Philippines is based. We have relied especially upon University
of the Philippines College of Law, Legal Aid in the Philippines (undated mimeograph,
circa 1965) Ihereinafter cited as Legal Aid in the Philippines].
71. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 416, § 3, 39 Stat. 545, 546; Act of July 1, 1902, ch.
1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691, 692; see Legal Aid in the Philippines.
72. General Order No. 58, cited in Legal Aid in the Philippines.
73. United States v. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207 (1905); see Legal Aid in the Philippines.
74. The constitution was drafted by elected delegates of the people at a constitu-
tional convention, adopted by vote of the people, and approved by the American govern-
ment pursuant to the Philippine Independence Act, which required the constitution to
provide for a ten year transitional period as a commonwealth, a republican form of gov-
ernment, a bill of rights, and protection of certain American rights and prerogatives.
75. Constitution art. III, § 1 (21) (Phil. 1935, revised 1973).
76. The constitution of 1935 remained in effect until January 17, 1973. On June
1, 1971, a duty elected constitutional convention convened to consider constitutional re-
vision. On September 21, 1972, the president declared martial law. On November 30,
1972, the convention approved a revised constitution, subject to ratification by the people
at plebiscite. On January 17, 1973, the president proclaimed that the revised constitu-
tion had been ratified by the people at a referendum of citizens assemblies conducted
by ballot and viva voce under the supervision of the martial law regime. In Javellana
v. Executive Secretary, 50 Sup. Ct. R. Ann. 30 (Mar. 31, 1973) (Decision No. L-36142)
the supreme court, in a divided opinion, held the new constitution of 1973 to be in effect.
77. RuLus oFCouRT 115-16, 122.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/9
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for compensation to attorneys de officio. The rules also exempt indi-
gent parties from filing fees and the printing of records and briefs. 7m
The Code of Civil Procedure enacted during the American colonial
period authorized the court in its discretion to assign counsel to an indi-
gent party in a civil action, 7 and similar provision was made by the
supreme court in the Rules of Court, which superseded the code.80 It
appears, however, that this provision has been largely ignored in prac-
tice.8 t
Two private legal aid offices were established in the years immedi-
ately following World War II. In 1946, the Women Lawyers' Associa-
tion of the Philippines (WLAP) formed the Free Legal Aid Clinic,
Funded by WLAP and the Community Chest, and located in an office
provided by the government in the Social Welfare Administration
Building in Manila, the Clinic receives over half of its cases by court
assignment or referral by the Social Welfare Administration. 2 A ma-
jority of its cases concern domestic relations. The balance includes
wage claims, property disputes, and criminal charges. Most cases are
disposed of by consultation, referral, or settlement, and only a small
number of litigation. In 1970, with a budget of approximately P 16,000
(or about U.S. $4,000.00 at the then current exchange rate), the Clinic
handled 646 cases.
In 1947, the University of the Philippines Women Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI) formed the Domestic Relations Consultation Center. Its
rationale was that women preferred to confide in women lawyers
in domestic relations cases. The Center was originally located in the
office of the WILOCI president and staffed by WILOCI volunteers.
In 1960, it was renamed the WILOCI Legal Consultation Center; serv-
ices were broadened to include all kinds of cases; and a permanent
staff lawyer and a clerk-typist were employed to supplement the WIL-
OCI volunteers. The Center has been financed by WILOCI benefit
performances and fund drives. As of 1965, the Center was handling
more than three hundred cases per year, and a panel of WILOCI vol-
unteers was handling about the same number of assigned cases in
juvenile and domestic relations court. The case load of the WILOCI
78. RuLEs OF COURT 41, 56, 124.
79. Act 190 § 35.
80. RULE OF COURT 138.
81. See Legal Aid in the Philippines.
82. Information derived from the ANNUAL REPORTS of the Clinic.
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Center appears to be similar in composition to the WLAP Legal Aid
Clinic.83
In 1967, at the initiative of Salvador H. Laurel, a practicing lawyer
and a member of a prominent family, the Philippine Bar Association
formed the Citizens' Legal Assistance Committee (CLAC). The
Committee was composed of ten prominent lawyers, with Laurel as
chairman. CLAC's rationale went well beyond traditional legal aid no-
tions of charity. Unlike the WLAP and WILOCI legal aid clinics,
which dealt principally with private disputes and problems, CLAC was
concerned with abuses of official authority and perversions of criminal
justice. Its stated purposes were:
(a) To render legal assistance and counsel -to helpless victims of op-
pression, intimidation, insult, violence, abuse, or other unlawful
acts perpetrated by any public official or his agents, particularly by
members of the police and armed forces;
(b) To provide free legal aid to citizens unable to prosecute serious and
valid criminal cases or to defend themselves against false and seri-
ous accusations by reason of poverty;
(c) Honest policemen and other agents of the law who in the per-
formance of their duties may be subjected to vengeance and in-
justice will also be accorded legal aid by the Committee; and
(d) To help defray necessary legal expenses in prosecuting and de-
fending such cases.8 4
Several months after the creation of CLAC, Laurel was nominated
by the leading political party as one of its candidates for the senate
in the 1967 elections. The day after his nomination, he announced
that he was resigning as chairman of CLAC in order to keep it free
from politics. After his election to the senate, he was again appointed
CLAC chairman by the board of directors of the Philippine Bar Asso-
ciation.
In 1969, CLAC was incorporated as Citizens' Legal Aid Society of
the Philippines (CLASP). CLASP's statement of purposes placed
somewhat less emphasis upon perversion of the administration of crim-
inal justice as its target. It provided that CLASP's purposes were:
83. See Grino-Aquino, A Nutshell History of the WILOCI Legal Consultation
Center (printed in program guide for a WILOCI benefit cinema); Legal Aid in the Phil.
ippines.
84. Resolution of the Philippine Bar Association May 16, 1967.
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1. To bring justice within the reach of the masses by providing free and
competent legal assistance and counsel to indigent litigants with
meritorious cases. Such assistance may take the form of legal ad-
vice and/or actual appearance in fiscal's offices, the courts, or ad-
ministrative bodies, in defense of the indigent litigants or to assist
him in the prosecution of a case in which he is party in interest.
2. To develop the social conscience of the members of the Bar by en-
listing their services in handling cases free of charge for indigent liti-
gant.
3. To check abuses, ineptness, and corruption in the judiciary, the po-
lice and the prosecuting agencies of the government and to help pro-
mote the dispensation of justice in the country by bringing to the
attention of the authorities concerned inadequacies in the adminis-
tration of those defects" 5
By 1970, CLASP had established 42 city and provincial chapters
throughout the country, had a roster of 339 volunteer lawyers, and had
received more than 9,000 cases and disposed of about 1,000 of them.86
A summary of 96 cases handled by CLAC includes many disputes be-
tween private citizens and police officers, both in the form of criminal
charges against CLAC clients and in the form of civil claims and disci-
plinary proceedings in behalf of other clients against police officers.8 T
In addition, CLAC lawyers prosecuted a number of ordinary personal
injury claims. It is interesting to note that many of the cases, including
those arising from violent assaults, were terminated by amicable settle-
ment or by the failure of the complaining witness to appear in the pro-
ceeding.
After his election, Senator Laurel introduced and congress enacted
four laws to assist low-income litigants by providing calendar prefer-
ences in criminal cases in which an indigent is involved, travel allow-
ances to indigent litigants and witnesses, free transcripts of proceed-
ings, and exemption from bail in offenses not of a serious character.88
85. Citizens' Legal Aid Society of the Philippines (CLASP), Articles of Incorpora-
tion (1969). In 1970, CLASP became a nonprofit foundation, apparently for tax rea-
sons, with the additional functions of granting scholarships to deserving law students and
establishing professorial chairs in social science and the humanities.
86. CLASP Brochure. See also Statement of Senator Laurel, Press Conference at
Manila Overseas Press Club, Dec. 15, 1968.
87. CLAC Report (undated).
88. Republic Act Nos. 6033-36 (1969). More particularly, the four "Laurel laws":
(1) require the courts to give calendar preference to criminal cases in which an indigent
is involved either as the victim or the accused, Republic Act No. 6033; (2) authorize
the courts to grant travel allowances to indigent litigants and witnesses for transporta-
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An indigent or low-income litigant is defined as one whose monthly in-
comes does not exceed r300 per month or is insufficient for the sub-
sistence of his family. (At the official rate of exchange at the time
of enactment of the laws, r300 was equivalent to approximately U.S.
$75; at today's floating rate, it is less than U.S. $50.)
During the 1950's, the social reform laws were enacted and adminis-
trative agencies were created to regulate agricultural tenancy and in-
dustrial labor relations. Under those laws, legal representation of ten-
ant farmers and industrial workers was provided by the Office of Ag-
rarian Counsel and the Department of Labor, respectively. Soon after
declaring martial law in 1972, President Marcos, by executive order,
implemented a plan for the reorganization of the executive branch of
government; the plan had been pending before congress.8 0 Pursuant to
tion, meals, and lodging from place of residence to the court and back, Republic Act
No. 6034; (3) require court stenographers to furnish free transcripts of proceedings to
indigent or low-income litigants, Republic Act No. 6035; and (4) exempt defendants
from posting bail if they are unable to afford it in cases involving offenses of a less
than serious character, except where the defendant has confessed, been caught in
flagranti, or violated the terms of bail, parole, or pardon, Republic Act No. 6036.
89. A Commission on Reorganization had been created in 1969, pursuant to an act
of congress passed in 1968 at the request of the president, to prepare an integrated reor-
ganization plan
to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it
to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the pub-
lie business
in the executive branch. Republic Act No. 5435 (1968). The commission was directed
to submit the plan to the president; the president was authorized to modify it and re-
quired to submit it to congress, with or without modification. Upon approval by con-
gress, the president was to implement the plan by issuing executive orders. The com-
mission was organized into a number of panels and staffed by a highly qualified group
of academic and government experts. It submitted a recommended plan to the president
late in 1970.
After a year of review, consultation, and revision, the integrated reorganization plan
was submitted to congress by the president. Congress did not act on the plan, however,
and independent bills were introduced in both houses to establish a Citizens' Legal As-
sistance Office. S. 927 (1972); H.R. 3537 (1972). In an explanatory note to the bill
introduced in the house of representatives, its sponsors stated:
In the past, the functions of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel have been en-
larged to make it more responsive to the needs of the farmers and other agri-
cultural workers by authorizing its attorneys to represent them in civil and
criminal cases before the Courts of Agrarian Relations and other courts. This
Office has thus become well-known in the rural areas for the legal services it
provides at the grassroots level. It is, therefore, the ideal organization whose
functions may be further expanded to provide legal services for a greater
number of poor people in urban areas with valid causes of action and specially
for those with legitimate complaints against abusive law-enforcement officers.
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the reorganization plan, the Office of Agrarian Counsel was abolished,
and the Citizens' Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) was created in the
Department of Justice, with the function of
represent[ing], free of charge, indigent persons . . . or the immediate
members of their family, in all civil, administrative, and criminal cases
where after due investigation the interests of justice will be served there-
by.90
By early 1973 CLAO had 106 lawyers and 200 additional staff per-
sonnel located in regional offices throughout the country. 91
No information is available on CLAO's caseload and the accomplish-
ments in its first year of operation. In view of the limitation of rep-
resentation to cases in which "after due investigation [it is deter-
mined that] the interests of justice will be served," the martial
law emphasis on social discipline and the well-publicized clear-
ance of squatter houses as one of the early acts of the martial law gov-
ernment, 92 it would be surprising to find CLAO representing urban
It is a fact that while our courts are open to all in theory, they are, in reality,
virtually closed to the people who do not have the money to pay for the serv-
ices of competent legal counsel and are often victimized by unscrupulous
shysters. This state of helplessness and discontent on their part against the
established order can be rectified or redressed only if the Government were to
show greater concern for the masses by providing free legal services for them,
as it did for the farmers in the rural areas.
The house passed the bill in May 1972. The senate bill, which was nearly identical,
was introduced by eighteen senators, representing both major parties. The president
ordered the creation of CLAO by Letter of Implementation No. 4, Oct. 23, 1972.
90. Letter of Implementation No. 20, Dec. 31, 1972. CLAO was organized in five
divisions: administrative, financial and management, special and appealed cases, legal
research and statistics, and field services.
91. As the framework for coherent decentralization of the administration of the var-
ious departments of the national government, the plan defined eleven regions, with speci-
fied regional centers. CLAO was directed to establish regional offices according to the
scheme of decentralization. Consistent with martial law themes of social and bu-
reaucratic discipline, the officer-in-charge issued a series of directives placing the CLAO
staff under strict rules on attendance, coffee breaks, use of vehicles, and general conduct.
Staff lawyers were even required to submit detailed daily activity reports. 1 THE CLAO
BuLL., Feb. 28, 1973, at 21-35.
92. The only newspaper allowed to publish in the first days of martial law, carried
a photograph on its first page showing squatters along the railroad tracks in Manila de-
molishing and removing their houses. The caption read:
They were tearing down instead of building up, but the community spirit pre-
vailed among these squatters along the railroad tra..ks in Beata, Pandacan, who
have had to give way to the rule of law and order as the New Society pursues
its program for meaningful reform. Hopefully, it shall also provide them with
the optimum climate and the maximum opportunity to be productive, useful,
self-respecting citizens.
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squatters in disputes with public or private landowners. More gen-
erally, it is not likely that any official legal aid office would systemati-
cally engage in the tactics of obstructive litigation that have been the
essence of the services provided to squatters by private lawyers in the
Philippines. 93
In 1974, the University of the Philippines College of Law established
a legal aid clinic. The clinic is staffed by law students as a mandatory
part of their curriculum and is operated under the supervision of an
experienced full-time attorney with faculty status. It appears to have
had a promising start. It is, however, difficult to imagine that such
a clinic would be of much help to squatters, whose possession of land
is clearly unlawful.
Although organized legal aid programs have not been designed to
solve problems of the poor in relation to urban development, law and
lawyers have been actively engaged in other ways in urban development
issues. The poor have probably been represented in legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial processes far more extensively in the Philippines
than in most other developing countries.
3. Urban Planning and Development Law in the Philippines
Between 1948 and 1970, metropolitan Manila grew from 1.6 to 4.3
million people. Squatters accounted for a great part of this growth.
By the mid-1960's, squatters represented about 25 percent of the popu-
lation, and their numbers were increasing at two to three times the rate
of total population growth in the metropolitan area.94 The regional
cities have experienced similar patterns of growth.
Philippines Daily Express, Oct. 10, 1972, at 1. The following day, the same news-
paper reported that 5,200 squatter houses along three esteros in Greater Manila had
been demolished and sixty percent of the occupants resettled about thirty kilometers
from Manila (1-1/2 hours, and T: 1.20 by public transportation). The other forty per-
cent had reportedly-but doubtfully-decided to return to the provinces from which they
had migrated to Manila. Philippines Daily Express, Oct. 11, 1972, at -. The
presidential order for the clearance of illegal structures and relocation of squatters is
contained in Letter of Instruction No. 19, Oct. 2, 1972, and Letter of Instruction No.
19-A, Oct. 28, 1972. At the same time, the president ordered a large privately-owned
tract in the suburbs of Manila (the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City) expropriated for
redistribution to the tenants and squatters occupying it and other low-income families.
Philippines Daily Express, Oct. 10, 1972, at 8. The presidential order is contained in
Letter of Instruction No. 34, Oct. 27, 1972.
93. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
94. These are estimates based on figures compiled at various times and on the basis
of various definitions of metropolitan Manila. See A. LAQurAN, supra note 1; SPECIAL
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Although sanitary conditions in Philippine cities are generally far
better than in many developing countries, the urban infrastructure has
become increasingly obsolete. The sewer systems of most Philippine
cities were constructed in the 1920's and 1930's, or earlier, and they
now adequately serve only twenty-five percent or less of the population.
Larger residential subdivisions are equipped with privately operated
community treatment facilities, which pollute streams and rivers.
Many homes have individual underground tanks that discharge on the
surface, and many others discharge or deposit human waste in the sea,
streams, drainage channels, or dumping grounds. In Manila, drain-
age has been seriously neglected, with the result that rainy seasons
bring frequent flooding and occasional loss of life. Potable water is
available almost everywhere, but often only at certain times of the day
and, in the poorer communities, only at neighborhood faucets or wells.
Electricity is available almost everywhere in the larger cities. Trans-
portation planning has principally been a matter of trying to build and
improve highways and bridges fast enough to keep up with spreading
cities and increasing automobile ownership. Access is uncontrolled
and strip commercial development, sometimes encroaching on the right
of way, is dominant. Traffic regulation is lax at best.
Although the Philippines has an abundance of laws and of-
ficial agencies for urban planning, effective planning beyond the
project level has been practically nonexistent.9 5 The National Plan-
ning Commission was created immediately after World War II and given
broad functions and powers of land use planning and control. Its major
effort, a plan for metropolitan Manila, became bogged down in political
and legal controversy. Then, the supreme court nullified the grant of
planning power to the commission. Thereafter, congress vested land
use planning powers in the local governments. Only a very few of the
local governments have attempted to exercise their planning functions,
and none has brought public or private land use under effective plan-
ning control. To the extent that zoning maps are not ignored entirely,
they are vitiated by ad hoe exceptions granted by local legislative
COMMrITE ON SQUATrING AND SLUM DWELLINo IN MErROPOLITAN MANILA, REPORT
(1968), reprinted in A. LAQULN, id., at App. B; Laquian, Coping with Internal Migra-
tion in the Philippines, SOLIDAITY, July 1973, at 14-28.
95. For a more detailed discussion of urban planning in the Philippines, see
Magavern, supra note 67; A. Santiago & J. Magavern, supra note 11; Santiago &
Magavern, Planning Law and Administration in Philippine Local Government, 3 PML.
P.AN. J. 15 (1971).
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bodies. Commercial and multiple dwelling uses abound in single-
family residential subdivisions. It is not altogether uncommon for land
ostensibly reserved for public use to be sold to private developers.
The Philippine Housing and Homesite Corporation was created to
clear slums and provide low-cost housing. Since it has not been sup-
ported by sufficient budgetary appropriations, the corporation has been
required, in the interest of survival, to concentrate its resources almost
entirely on self-amortizing projects for the upper-middle-class. Mas-
sive low-cost housing programs, occasionally announced by the govern-
ment, have invariably turned out to be neither massive nor low cost.
The National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority was created to con-
solidate municipal systems, but became enmeshed in litigation and was
required by judicial decision to return to the municipalities a number
of the systems that it had taken over. The National Air and Water
Pollution Control Commission was created by an act of congress in
1964, but was not fully organized until several years later. Even then
it was severely understaffed and underfinanced. It has recently re-
ceived more substantial, but still insufficient, support. Although the
commission has performed well within the limitations of its financial
and political resources, overall levels of air and water pollution have
not evidenced significant abatement.
From time to time, congress and economic planning agencies have
declared it to be national policy to disperse demographic and eco-
nomic growth more evenly throughout the country. Regional develop-
ment authorities have been created by legislation, but most have never
been organized as operational entities, and none has received sufficient
financial and political support. Although one of the objectives of the
Board of Investments is to disperse industrial development, the enter-
prises to which it has awarded incentives are heavily concentrated in
the Manila region and certain rapidly growing sections of Mindanao.
Notwithstanding a declared goal of dispersed growth, a similar pattern
can be found in the investment program of the national four-year de-
velopment plan.9"
The martial law regime has implemented a sweeping reorganization
plan, shifted power from politicians to technocrats, and strengthened
planning and administration both technically and politically. While it
is still too early 'to know how urban development policy will be affected,
96. See A. Santiago & J. 'Magavern, supra note 11.
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no radical change should be expected, if only because the critical eco-
nomic and demographic factors are not readily amenable to the knowl-
edge, techniques, and controls available to planning authorities.
To say that urban planning has not been effective is not to say that
urban development patterns have been without merit. Manila has de-
veloped into a national center for politics, education, communications,
and social change. Tagalog, the basis for the language mandated by
the constitution, has developed spontaneously and rapidly, and is in-
creasingly understood in the outlying regions. Social and political links
between Manila and the provinces remain strong. Urban population
growth has relieved some of the pressure of overpopulation in the rural
areas. Within urban areas, densely populated settlements of the poor
(many of them squatter settlements) have developed in areas acces-
sible to employment and public transporation, without substantial ex-
penditure of public funds. It is possible, when necessary, to convert
land occupied by those settlements to use in the modern sector, usually
with some form of compensation to the occupants, if only in the form
of an inadequate relocation site. While land use controls have been
almost entirely ineffective, the resulting patterns of intensive, mixed
land use are in many respects more suitable to the Philippine context
than the lower density, segregated patterns contemplated by the zoning
ordinances on the books, which are based on American models.
Prior to martial law, the Philippine political system was sufficiently
open to allow the poor a voice in government, but was incapable of
subordinating special interests to the degree required for effective ur-
ban development planning. Those characteristics had both advantages
and disadvantages for the urban poor. Urban squatters were able, with
the aid of legal and political representation, to maintain relatively se-
cure possession of the land they occupied. Although most squatting
was on public land, squatters were able to occupy private land whose
owners had relaxed their surveillance. Once squatters had occupied
land, it became extremely difficult to dislodge them. Lawyers were
readily available to represent them in eviction proceedings. By means
of a fabricated claim to possession and repeated motions on every point
conceivable, attorneys were able to keep the owner tied up in litigation
for years.97 Judicial dockets were overloaded, and on occasion lawyers
reportedly were able to bribe judges to procure further delays. When
97. For an c nzpz, R. STONE, supra note 12, at ch. 4.
Vol. 1975:45]
Washington University Open Scholarship
88 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
finally confronted with imminent judgment, the squatter could quietly
"sell" his occupancy to another squatter, thus requiring still further pro-
ceedings against the new occupant. Even in possession of a judgment,
an owner would find it difficult to evict a squatter family who, having
no place to go, simply declined to move. Given the prospect of pro-
tracted legal proceedings, many owners chose simply to negotiate with
squatters to secure the latter's departure in exchange for some agreed
compensation.
If the legal system made it difficult for land owners to evict squat-
ters, until recently it also thwarted programs designed to redistribute
private land to squatters. The Philippine constitution provides ex-
pressly that, upon payment of just compensation, private lands may be
expropriated for subdivision into small lots and conveyance at cost to
individuals. 98 On a number of occasions the government attempted to
use that provision to expropriate and redistribute private land to urban
squatters. In a series of cases, however, the supreme court, on ques-
tionable grounds of constitutional history and anticommunist ideology,
held the constitutional provision to apply only to "landed estates with
extensive areas." 99 Those decisions, in effect, ruled out urban land re-
form. In the 1960's, however, the court began to express an increas-
ingly liberal philosophy in regard to social reform, and in 1970 it ren-
dered an important decision severely limiting, if not overruling, the ear-
lier line of cases. In J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administra-
tion, 00 the court sustained the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in
Quezon City, a suburb of Manila and the national capital. The land
in question, comprising about 100 hectares and occupied by some
1,500 families, had been -the subject of a title dispute between the
Tuason company and another firm. Prior to the determination that the
Tuason company was the true owner, the occupants of the land had
entered into transactons with the other firm for purchase of their lots.
Some had constructed their houses as early as 1947. In 1959, congress
enacted a law directing that the Tatalon Estate be expropriated and
redistributed to the occupants and barring ejectment proceedings
98. Constitution art. XIV, § 13 (Phil. 1973), formerly art. XIII § 4 (1935). The
present constitution provides that such lots may be conveyed to "deserving citizens,"
rather than simply to "individuals," the language of the 1935 constitution.
99. Republic v. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461 (1955). For a discussion of this and other
cases on point, see Magavem, supra note 67, at 613-18.
100. 33 Sup. Ct. R. Ann. 82, 66 Official Gazette 6758 (Phil. Feb. 18, 1970) (Deci-
sion No. 21064).
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against the occupants.'' In 1962, the supreme court held the bar
against ejectment proceedings to be unconstitutional."0 2 In 1963, a
lower court, relying on earlier decisions of the supreme court, held
the statute to be unconstitutional in its provision for expropriation of
the property. In its 1970 opinion in Tuason, the supreme court re-
versed the decision of the lower court, reexamined the earler line of
decisions, and redefined the scope and limits of the constitutional pro-
vision for land reform. It is not necessary to consider the details of
the opinion here. The court reviewed the relevant constitutional history
and held that congress, provided that it acts reasonably and with due
regard to the requirements of just compensation, public use, due proc-
ess, and equal protection, is empowered to direct that substantial tracts
of urban land be expropriated for redistribution to occupants. The
Tuason court explicitly rejected the doctrine of the earlier cases, citing
its "undue stress on property rights.' 03  By September 22, 1972, when
martial law was declared, the Tatalon Estate still had not been redis-
tributed. Soon thereafter, at the same time many squatter houses were
being cleared in other areas, the president ordered the property to be
expropriated and redistributed to the occupants.0 4
On public land, squatters were usually able to achieve greater se-
curity of tenure. Despite occasional official announcements of "get-
tough" policies, clearance of squatter settlements was effected in few
instances. Large-scale clearance projects were coupled with relocation
programs. In most cases, however, relocation sites were too far from
the city and lacked urban services, employment opportunities, and ade-
quate transportation to other places of employment. Consequently, re-
located squatters tended to sift back to the city, where they resumed
squatting in new locations. The prevailing, but officially unacknowl-
edged, policy toward squatting on public land was one of de facto ac-
quiescence. A number of laws were enacted directing that particular
tracts of public land be subdivided, streets and sewers provided, and
title awarded to the occupants by sale at cost with long-term install-
ment payments. Most of those laws were never implemented, but nei-
ther were the squatters evicted. Moreover, there usually were more
101. Republic Act No. 2616 (1959), as amended, Republic Act No. 3453 (1962).
102. Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, 6 Sup. CL R. Ann. 595 (1962).
103. 33 Sup. Ct. R. Ann. at-, 66 Official Gazette at 6771.
104. Letter of Instruction No. 34, Oct. 27, 1972; see Philippines Daily Express, Oct.
10, 1972, at 8.
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occupants on the land than permitted by the statutory provisions estab-
lishing minimum lot sizes and the necessary reservations of land for
streets and other public uses. Even apart from these difficulties, the
costs of constructing roads and sewers and surveying, sorting out, and
registering lots in the names of occupants far exceeded the resources
committed to implementation of the laws.
The security of tenure that squatters achieved on public land was
dependent to some extent on legal representation, and to a greater extent
on political representation. When the government brought judicial pro-
ceedings to evict squatters, lawyers were often able to obstruct them by
the same methods used against eviction proceedings brought by private
owners. In the mid-1950's, however, the supreme court held that squat-
ting on public land constituted a public nuisance, which municipal offi-
cials could abate summarily, without judicial proceedings. 106 Neverthe-
less, municipal governments continued to bring occasional judicial pro-
ceedings for eviction, possibly as a gesture to middle class voters that
they were doing something about "the squatter problem." In an action
for eviction initiated in 1962 by the City of Manila and decided by the
supreme court in 1967, the court, noting that the city might have em-
ployed the remedy of summary abatement, expressed considerable im-
patience with squatters, lawyers, and public officials:
But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who,
by means fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the
day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands
particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some public officials to enforce
the government's rights. Obstinancy of these squatters is difficult to ex-
plain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright en-
couragement or protection. 0 7
105. The stabilizing effects of legalization of tenure in a squatter settlement are dem-
onstrated by a comparison of the communities on either side of a major highway in
Davao, a rapidly growing regional city in Mindanao. On one side, title was awarded
to the squatters occupying the land; on the other side it was not. On the one side of
the highway, lot lines are regular, access is available by regular public streets, and the
houses are of solid construction and under constant improvement. On the other side,
houses are flimsy and squeezed together in a helter-skelter fashion, with access only by
meandering passageways among the houses.
106. Sitchon v. Aquino, 98 Phil. 453 (1956); see also Quinto v. Lacson, - Sup. Ct.
R. Ann. -, 50 Official Gazette 5095 (Phil. 1960); Halili v. Lacson, 98 Phil. 772
(1956).
107. City of Manila v. Garcia, - Sup. Ct. R. Ann. - (Phil. Feb. 21, 1967) (Deci-
sion No. L-26053). For a description of the background of this case, see R. STONE,
supra note 12.
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Ironically, five years after the city's victory in the supreme court, the
land still remained occupied by the squatters, who explained that their
lawyer had influence with a Manila councilor s08 Apart from their
ability to obstruct eviction in protracted legal proceedings, squatters
were usually able to bargain with aspiring or incumbent politicians for
protection against ouster by official action. 10 9 Political candidates who
did not actively seek the express support of squatter organizations at
least hesitated to take a position that could mobilize about one fourth
of their urban constituents against them. For example, during the
1969 presidential election campaign, President Marcos quietly sus-
pended a program he had announced with some fanfare several months
earlier to clear squatters who for three decades had occupied the right
of way adjacent to railroad tracks in Manila.
While squatters were usually able to maintain fairly secure tenure
through participation in the political process, they were vulnerable to
exploitation. In some squatter settlements, policemen were reported
to collect regular "rent" payments from residents. Politicians occa-
sionally retaliated against squatters who did not give them sufficient
support in elections by having them evicted.1 0 More fundamentally,
the political system did not provide the support required for planned
development programs to improve the condition of squatter and slum
settlements. Laws directing the expropriation and redistribution of
private land were, for many years, subject to judicial nullification; even
after the favorable Tuason decision, little was done to implement such
laws. Statutory mandates that public facilities be provided and title
be awarded to squatters on public land were seldom carried out effec-
tively. Relocation programs were invariably ill-planned, uncoordi-
nated, and entirely inadequate for the most basic needs of the squat-
ters. 111
4. The Tondo Foreshore Land
The way in which the political system worked to the advantage as
well as the disadvantage of urban squatters and the tension and process
108. R. STONE, supra note 12, at 115.
109. A. LAQu'NJ, supra notes 1 & 60; R. SroNE, supra note 12; ZoNE ONE ToN o
ORGANIZATION, ZOTO Is PEOPLE PowEni, May 13, 1973 [hereinafter cited as ZOTO
PUBLICATION].
110. For an example, see R. STONE, supra note 12, at 116.
111. See A. LAQUIAN, supra note 60; R. POETHIG, supra note 8.
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of accommodation between the formal legal order and illegal urban
settlement are exemplified by the experience of the Tondo Foreshore
Land.112 The Tondo Foreshore Land comprises 185 hectares re-
claimed by the Bureau of Public Works from Manila Bay, adjacent to
the North Harbor of Manila. The government's purpose in re-
claiming the land was to develop it for a port-related complex of mari-
time, industrial, and civic uses. The plan was to allocate a small
portion of the land to low-cost housing for workers in the port area.
In the disorder of post-World War II reconstruction, large numbers of
urban in-migrants flooded the city and settled on any land available,
preferring large tracts of public land near places of employment. A
settlement was soon established on the Tondo Foreshore Land. The
settlement continued to grow and is now the most heavily populated
squatter community in the country, containing more than 100,000 peo-
ple.11 3
The original as well as many of the more recently built houses were
constructed of bamboo, palm leaves, scrap lumber, tarpaper, and cor-
rugated steel, usually on piles, in the manner of traditional rural houses.
Many houses were constructed over the tide waters, connected by a
network of narrow plank walkways. As the residents became estab-
lished, they progressively improved their houses. Those houses situ-
ated on dry land were often reconstructed of concrete blocks. Access
is by narrow, meandering lanes and plank walkways. In one area, a
vigorous community organization, with outside assistance, has recently
constructed a community center, plaza, and full size basketball court.
Otherwise, recreational and open space is limited to alleyways, sea-
walls, and small irregular lots and basketball courts. In a survey
114
of a recently settled area, electricity was found to be available to thirty
percent and piped water to twenty percent of the houses; seventy percent
of the people did not have a toilet in their house and used vacant lots,
the sea, or the "wrap-and-throw" method. Roughly two-thirds of the
112. The main sources of this account are A. LAQuIAN, supra note 1; REPORT OF SPE-
CIAL COMMITrEE ON SQUATrING AND SLUM DWELLING IN MErROPOLrrAN MANILA
(1966), reprinted in A. LAQUIAN, supra note 1, at app. B; ZOTO PUBLICATION; B. Ether-
ington, Chronicle of the Tondo Fire, 1971 (unpublished master's thesis, on file at the
University of the Philippines Institute of Planning); clippings from the Manila Times
in 1970-71; authors' visits to the site.
113. The figure is a guess based on a variety of population and area estimates pro-
vided in the sources cited in note 9 supra.
114. See A. LkQI.N, supra note 1.
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families had monthly incomes in the range of P 50 to P200. (The rate
of exchange at that time was approximately P4 to US $1). Consider-
ing that more general surveys of squatter settlements in Manila disclose
that electricity is available in seventy percent of the households," 5 it
seems probable that electricity is more commonly available in older
areas of the Foreshore Land. For those houses without piped water,
clean water is usually available at a nearby community faucet.
In 1950, the squatters organized the Tondo Foreshore Land Tenants
Association and persuaded congress to enact a law to grant them title
to the land they occupied. The statute, Republic Act 559, directed
the Director of Lands, "without delay and without public bidding," to
sell to "lessees and bona fide occupants" all of the foreshore land ex-
cept such portions as might be reserved for port facilities, roads, and
other public uses. It created a commission, made up of the city asses-
sor, a representative of the Bureau of Lands, and a representative of
the Tondo Foreshore Land Tenants Associations, to fix the price for
the land within a range of I 5 to P 10 per square meter. The purchase
price was to be payable over a ten year term with interest at four per-
cent per annum. Alienation within five years after issuance of a certi-
ficate of title was prohibited, and any subsequent conveyance was to
be subject to the right of the original purchaser to repurchase within
five years. Any violation of the restriction against alienation would
cause the property to be forfeited. On the same day that he approved
the Act, President Quirino issued a proclamation reserving a portion of
the land for low-cost housing projects under the administration of the
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation." 6
In 1953, the Act was amended to include a boundary description of
the Tondo Foreshore Land." 7 When the Act still had not been imple-
mented in 1956, the Tenants Association induced congress to enact a
new law, the Tondo Foreshore Land Act of 1956."1 The new Act
directed the Director of Lands, notwithstanding President Quirino's
proclamation of 1950, to subdivide immediately all of the Foreshore
Land, except areas reserved for port facilities, roads, and other public
115. See REPORT OF SPECIAL CommrEE ON SQUATTING AND SLUM DWELLO IN
KETROPOLrrAN MANILA, supra note 112.
116. Proclamation No. 187, June 17, 1950.
117. Republic Act No. 907 (1953), amending Republic Act No. 559 (1950).
118. Republic Act No. 1597 (1956), amending Republic Act No. 559, (1950) su-
perseding Proclamation No. 187, June 17, 1950.
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uses, into lots "in such manner that every lessee or bona fide occupant
of any parcel will not be deprived of any part of the same." It provided
that existing streets and alleys were not to be changed unless the public
interest so demanded. Occupants displaced by the opening or widen-
ing of streets were to be given preference in the sale of vacant lots
or, if there should not be enough vacant lots in the Foreshore Land,
in the sale of lots in a nearby area or in the sale or rental of houses
to be constructed in Tondo by the People's Homesite and Housing Cor-
poration. The Act ordered completion of a survey and subdivision plan
within one year after approval of the Act and directed the Land Tenure
Administration thereafter to sell lots to the occupants without delay.
The selling price was fixed at r 5 per square meter, not to be increased
by reason of the costs of roads, sewers, surveying or subdivision. The
purchase price was made payable in monthly installments over fifteen
years, with interest at four percent per annum. Except for mortgages,
alienation was prohibited within fifteen years. The Land Tenure
Administration was required to implement the Act upon "proper con-
sultation" with the Federation of Tondo Foreshore Land Tenants
Association. The sum of I 400,000 was appropriated to carry out the
Act.
In 1959, the Tondo Foreshore Land Act, which still had not been
implemented, was amended to enlarge the area to be conveyed to the
Foreshore Land residents by moving the western boundary closer to
the piers, thereby reducing the area set aside for port facilities." 90 In
1961 President Macapagal issued a proclamation reserving a site of
nine hectares for a stadium planned by the City of Manila. 120 In 1963,
the Federation obtained passage of an act 21 appropriating an addi-
tional D:3 00,000 for implementation of the Tondo Foreshore Land Act
of 1956. Just before the expiration of his term of office at the close
of 1965, President Macapagal revoked his earlier proclamation reserv-
ing a site for a stadium and declared the site available for disposition
to the residents.122
Meanwhile, late in 1963 the mayor of Manila initiated a sweeping
program of squatter clearance. Relying on earlier rulings by the
119. Republic Act No. 2439 (1959), amending Republic Act No. 1597 (1956).
120. Proclamation No. 788, Sept. 22, 1961, revoked by Proclamation No. 515, Dec.
26, 1965.
121. Republic Act No. 3794 (1963).
122. Proclamation No. 515, Dec. 26, 1965, revoking Proclamation No. 788, Sept. 22,
1961.
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supreme court that squatter settlements on public land constitute a pub-
lic nuisance, which municipal officials are empowered to abate sum-
marily, without judicial proceedings, the Mayor set out to clear
Intramuros, the ancient walled city of Manila. 123  Representatives of
the squatters sued for a preliminary injunction against clearance, but
the court denied their application. The next day, the squatters and
whatever they could salvage of their dwellings were loaded into
garbage trucks. The remaining structures were razed, and the people
were transported to Sapang Palay, 35 kilometers away. Sapang Palay
was a 752 hectare tract of rural land owned by the People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation. Although it had previously been proposed
as a squatter resettlement site, no real planning had been done. When
the squatters arrived from Intramuros, the site lacked shelter, water,
sanitation facilities, adequate public transportation to Manila, and
means for the squatters to make a living. During the following weeks,
as 20,000 people were trucked in from Manila, responsibility for their
food, shelter and resettlement shifted from one official, agency, or com-
mittee to another. None possessed the political authority and
economic resources required to bring order to the confusion and
establish a tenable community. Wells were drilled, but some ran dry.
Food and medical services were distributed by welfare and relief
organizations. People constructed makeshift shelters wherever they
found unclaimed space and with whatever materials they had brought
along or could find on the site. Speculators staked claim to lots. Six
months after settlement began, a typhoon destroyed ninety percent of
the houses that had been built. A master plan was drawn up but never
implemented. A special coordinating committee, headed by the Chair-
man of the National Economic Council, proposed that Sapang Palay be
developed as an agro-industrial estate, but failed to indicate how this
was to be accomplished. As the inherent difficulties of the Sapang
Palay project became more and more imposing, official interest waned.
Eventually about two-thirds of the people transported to Sapang Palay
resumed squatting in Manila, many in the Tondo Foreshore Land. 24
Initially, the press gave the relocation program extensive coverage
and expressed mixed reactions of satisfaction at the clearance of public
lands and sympathy for the displaced squatters. In January 1964, the
123. This account of the clearance of Intramuros and the Sapang Palay resettlement
are drawn from A. LAQuIAN, supra note 60, at 143-69.
124. Estimate in 1968 by public officials. Cf. A. LAQuIAN, supra note 1, at 24.
Vol. 1975:45]
Washington University Open Scholarship
96 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
mayor, having cleared Intramuros, shifted his attention to other
squatter settlements, including the Tondo Foreshore Land. In one
area the residents organized quickly to secure the support of a con-
gressman and other politicians. As a result of this political interven-
tion, eviction was not attempted in that area.125 In another, less
fortunate area, all but five large houses were razed, and the residents
were transported to Sapang Palay. When they returned to Tondo a
year later, they found that their former home sites had been claimed
by city policemen and political favorites. The former residents, there-
fore, were forced to squeeze into whatever space they could find
remaining in the Foreshore Land. 26
In April 1971, a fire swept through 15 blocks of the Tondo
Foreshore Land, leaving more than 8,000 families homeless.127  Fire-
men were unable to fight the fire because the lanes among the houses
were too narrow for their equipment. As in the case of the Sapang
Palay resettlement project, public and private officials and agencies
responded with a bewildering array of uncoordinated plans, promises,
press releases, and ad hoc relief efforts. The president ordered the
National Housing Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation to prepare a housing program for the victims. The mayor
announced plans to construct apartment buildings in the razed area and
pledged I 2 million to start the program. The Chairman of the National
Housing Corporation announced that within two weeks emergency
housing would be constructed for 600 families and that permanent four
story condominium apartments would be constructed in the area
125. A. LQuI N, supra note 1, at 98-99.
126. ZOTO PUBLICATION 5. Even today, several large, expensive houses and an at-
tached row of apartment units, reputedly owned by city policemen and politicians, can
be seen in the area. One other massive relocation project has since been attempted. In
1968, a large tract of public land was cleared. Originally laid out as the "East Tri-
angle," the national capitol complex in Quezon City, the tract had long since been occu-
pied by squatters, many of whom had built relatively large houses constructed of concrete
blocks. Relocation was provided in Carmona, a site about thirty-five kilometers and two
hours away by public transportation. Although management of the Carmona project
represented a great improvement over the original Sapang Palay resettlement project,
there was no way for most of the squatters to make a living at the relocation site. Con-
sequently, during the weeks prior to the scheduled clearance of the East Triangle, many
of the squatters moved their houses and belongings, often at night, to nearby public and
private sites where they again squatted.
127. This account of the Tondo fire is drawn principally from E. Eterington, supra
note 112, supplemented by clippings from the Manila Times of that period and recollec-
tions from the authors' visits.
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thereafter. While the Red Cross was distributing galvanized sheeting
to enable the squatters to rebuild their houses, the Department of
Social Welfare proposed that they be returned to their original home
provinces or resettled outside Manila. The Cardinal joined with the
mayor in announcing a plan to construct prefabricated two story condo-
minium houses, but the Manila Municipal Board refused to appropriate
the money requested to start the project. A senator and a congressman
proposed redevelopment of the area with an adequate infrastructure
system and in accordance with a rational plan. The president created
a special steering committee and announced that parts of the area would
be reserved for construction of a government housing project and ex-
tension of a major highway. The National Planning Commission called
for the construction of a complex of high-rise apartment buildings and
community facilities, together with the industrial and port facilities
originally planned for the Foreshore Land. The squatters objected to
their exclusion from the planning, reiterated their demand for title
to their lots, and proceeded to reconstruct their houses. When the
mayor ordered demolition of dwellings rebuilt in the fire area, the
squatters put up human barricades to stop the demolition squad. In
the ensuing confrontation, a fifteen-year-old boy was shot and killed
by police. The mayor stopped further demolition. By the end of the
month, nearly the entire area had been rebuilt. Three years later,
twenty apartment units were completed and occupied; a small number
of barracks-like, temporary units built by the army appeared to have
become permanent; and the area had otherwise returned to normal.
In the meantime, the Federation of Tondo Foreshore Land Tenants
Association had become defunct and a new organization had been
formed to represent the 60,000 residents of Zone One, an area of fifty
hectares of Foreshore Land.12 8  The Zone One Tondo Temporary
Organization (ZOTTO) was created with the assistance of a commun-
ity organization staff provided by the Philippine Ecumenical Council
on Community Organization. Its purpose was to establish a permanent
128. In January 1969, another organization, the Council of Tondo Foreshoreland
Community Organizations, had been formed by surviving member organizations of the
defunct Federation. Implementation of the Tondo Foreshore Land Act of 1956, Repub-
lic Act No. 1957, was its main issue. The Council soon fell apart in internal conflict
involving charges of corruption against its leaders. ZOTO, later renamed ZOTO, was
formed by a group of organizations dissatisfied with the Council's leadership. ZOTO
PUBLICATION 9. TIle account of the Zone One Tondo Organization in the following text
is drawn from ZoTo PUBLICATION.
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community organization on the principles developed by Saul Alinsky
and the Industrial Areas Foundation. ZOTTO was formed in October
1970. A year and a half later, it held its first convention, elected
officers, dropped the word "Temporary" from its name, and became
a permanent organization, ZOTO.
Shortly before ZOTO's inaugural convention, the Bureau of Public
Works started construction of a warehouse and depot on a vacant parcel
in Zone One known as the Farola compound. ZOTTO quickly exe-
executed the first organized squatter invasion in the Philippines.
Access lanes were laid out in a gridiron pattern; lots measuring six by
six meters were staked out and registered in the organization's records;
and, in order to establish possession, construction of houses was at least
started on most lots.
In the two years between the organization of ZOTTO and the
declaration of martial law, the organization successfully confronted and
negotiated with a remarkable variety of private, national, and interna-
tional officials and agencies involved in plans for development of the
Tondo Foreshore Land. These included congress, the president, the
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, the Bureau of Customs,
the Department of Public Works and Communication, the mayor of
Manila, the San Miguel Corporation (the largest business enterprise in
the country), the Cement Association of the Philippines Corporation,
the Catholic church, a German international development agency, and
the United Nations Development Program. In the process, ZOTO
and its predecessor employed tactics such as picketing, rallies, marches,
and mass demonstrations. It also secured the support of sympathetic
individuals and organizations, appealed publicly to the consciences of
its adversaries, and looked ultimately to negotiation and agreement to
resolve issues.
Soon after the declaration of martial law in September 1972, several,
ZOTO leaders were arrested and detained for several days. Although
ZOTO was at first brought to a standstill, it soon regained enough con-
fidence to enlist the aid of the sympathetic Catholic Bishop of Manila
in a moderately conducted protest against the squatter clearance
program initiated' by President Marcos after the declaration of martial
law. The Bishop appeared to play a decisive role in a series of negotia-
tions that resulted in an agreement between ZOTO and the govern-
ment. According to the agreement, clearance of the Tondo Foreshore
Land will be deferred until a 300 hectare resettlement site is ready on
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land to be reclaimed at Navotas. Navotas lies to the north of Tondo
and is reasonably accessible to the harbor area and its opportunities for
employment in fishing, port work, and hawking. The World Bank is
considering a loan request for the Navotas project. Whether the
project will be successfully implemented remains to be seen.
5. Conclusion
It is difficult to predict how squatters will fare under martial law.
Two of the early acts of the president following the declaration of mar-
tial law have already been noted: the creation of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office and the order to expropriate and redistribute the
Tatalon Estate to its occupants and other low-income families.'29 At
the same time, however, the president ordered the clearance of
squatter housing along the railroad tracks and esteros of Manila and
in certain parts of the Tondo Foreshore Land. Although clearance was
stopped in the Foreshore Land as the result of successful representa-
tions to the president by ZOTO and the Bishop, it has proceeded in
other areas. It appears that the administration may be able to clear
existing squatter settlements and implement land redistribution and
sites-and-services projects more effectively than in the past.
Squatters have lost a considerable part of their former political
bargaining power. While martial law continues, they will no longer be
able to prevent eviction by obstruction of judicial process or negotiation
with elective office holders. Militant protest tactics of the kind
developed by ZOTO will no longer be tolerated. Rather than lawyers
and politicians, the most effective representatives of squatters may now
be clergymen and church organizations, and perhaps other influential
individuals and institutions not perceived as a political threat to the
regime. It is not clear whether, in respect to their immediate environ-
mental needs, the urban poor will gain or lose from martial law and
the resulting shift of power from elective politicians to appointed techno-
crats. It does seem clear that the role of lawyers has been greatly dimin-
ished. With the abolition of congress, suspension of elective politics, and
concentration of power in the executive, the fate of squatter settlements
129. See notes 91, 92, 104 supra and accompanying text. Social justice has been one
of the themes of the martial law government. Land reform appears to have been in-
tensified. On the other hand, critics of the government feel that it is essentially reac-
tionary in character.
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will no longer be determined in the judicial, legislative, and political
arenas, in which lawyers and legal processes played such a significant
part in the past.
III. THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE POOR
At the risk of oversimplification, two distinct approaches to legal
service programs can be identified: a service approach, which attempts
to provide to the poor the legal advice and representation they need
to identify and enforce rights embodied in existing law; a policy
approach, which attempts to change governmental policy and bring into
being basic, new legal rights for the poor. The distinction is not clear
cut, and the differences are of degree. There are intermediate possi-
bilities for creating new rights by elaboration of more fundamental and
incompletely defined rights, and any program will represent both
approaches to some extent.
It seems clear that a service approach would be essentially misdi-
rected, if not entirely irrelevant, to the problems of the urban poor in
the areas of housing and environmental conditions. As squatters and
pavement dwellers, without legal claim to the space they occupy, the
poor lack legal recognition of their right even to live or exist in the cities.
There is no stock of conventional housing that can be made available
to the poor through the "trickledown" effect of regulatory or market
intervention techniques directed to the private sector. Housing codes
and rent controls can have no application in such a situation. Nor are
there constitutional or statutory rights that the poor can invoke in
judicial proceedings to require affirmative governmental action to
provide land, housing, and urban services. It is often assumed by pro-
ponents of legal service programs that the interests of the poor are best
secured by effective and uniform enforcement of the law. For many
problems, such as the implementation of social reform legislation and
restraint of abuses of official authority, that assumption is plainly
correct. In order for many of the urban poor to maintain their homes
and communities, however, the law must be frustrated rather than en-
forced. Consequently, legal services predicated upon existing rights
at most can confer upon the poor a sort of negative power-the ability,
through procedural delays and the like, to obstruct the enforcement of
substantive law.
If what the poor need is the creation of effective new legal rights
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in the urban development process rather than the improved administra-
tion of existing law, a policy approach designed to assist the poor in
obtaining those fights would be logically relevant to the problem. Such
an approach, as the label suggests, would be fundamentally political in
nature. The problem is to induce government to adopt and effectively
implement urban development policies favorable to the poor.
The possibility of developing an effective legal services program
directed toward a meaningful urban development policy would
seem to depend upon certain fundamental characteristics of the
political system in which the program would operate. A priori, three
essential political conditions can be identified: a compatible ideology;
a secure legal base for advocacy of the interests of the poor; and a gov-
ernment capable of implementing urban development plans.13
The idea that the position of the poor can be significantly improved
through legal advice and representation is closely associated with cer-
tain assumptions about political ideology and the role of law. Under
these assumptions, politics is seen as a process of pluralistic contention
among a variety of individuals, groups, and legitimate interests. The
role of law is to provide a neutral vehicle for such contention, with fixed
rules of procedure and jurisdictional limitations, but highly differenti-
ated from the broader political system of which it is a part. In addition,
it is often assumed that the development of a formal, highly differenti-
ated legal system is associated with economic modernization as a
necessary condition, an inevitable consequence, or both. Those
assumptions, though deeply imbedded in the western countries, are not
universally held.
Roberto Unger has identified three kinds of political development:
(1) liberal capitalist, (2) traditionalist, and (3) revolutionary social-
ist.131 The role of law in the ideology of liberal capitalist society, ex-
130. The immediate concern of this Article is with legal services in relation to urban
environmental conditions. As already noted, our analysis and conclusions are de-
termined and limited to a great extent by the condition that squatters, by definition, do
not have a legal right to the land they occupy. Moreover, effective urban planning is
one of the most politically difficult of all governmental functions. To a degree, how-
ever, the political conditions discussed here have broader implications for legal service
programs where, as is often the case, the problems of the poor, urban or rural, can be
identified with a lack of sufficient legal rights or the basic political inability of govern-
ment to give effect to existing legal rights.
131. R. Unger, The Place of Law in "Modern" Society: Sketch for an Interpretation
(undated, unpublished paper on file in Yale University Law Library). This classifica-
tion is not intended to be exhaustive.
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emplified by Western Europe, conforms roughly to the above-men-
tioned assumptions. In accordance with that ideology, legal services
can be viewed as a means to enable the poor to compete effectively
within a neutral legal system and perhaps even as a means of assuring
the neutrality of the system itself.13 2
In traditionalist modernization, exemplified by Japan, economic
development is directed by the elite in conjunction with an effort to
maintain traditional social values, practices, and hierarchical structures.
Government is not constrained by and does not operate through a
formal legal system. Rather, it supports and is supported by traditional
social groups and structures. Issues are resolved by informal, tradi-
tional structures and processes rather than by a differentiated, formal
legal system. To the extent that a society embodies this ideology, legal
professionals, relying upon explicit formal norms and adjudication, may
be neither welcome nor effective in advancing the interests of the poor.
In a revolutionary socialist society, for example China, individual
interests are viewed as subordinate to collective goals. The central
government and the new social organizations it creates are fused.
Together, they serve to effect comprehensive changes in all areas of
society. Law functions, not as a neutral, differentiated, and autonom-
ous vehicle for the accommodation of conflicting claims, but as an
instrument to carry out a political program. Such a society will offer
little place to legal professionals invoking distinctly legal rules and
independently representing the poor before specialized tribunals.
Even in societies that do not conform to the pure revolutionary
socialist type described by Unger, socialist ideology may be unreceptive
to the concept of legal services to the poor. Neelan Tiruchelvam has
analyzed the ideology and institutions of popular justice in a number
of countries, including the Soviet Union, Cuba, Tanzania, India, and
Burma, as well as China. 8 3  The popular justice programs of those
countries manifest considerable divergences, especially in the way they
resolve the fundamental ambiguity between the conflicting objectives
of granting or restoring political control to local popular groups, and
of extending the norms of the central political order into areas of social
life not previously regulated by the state. Nevertheless, they have in
132. It should be noted, however, that Unger believes this ideology to embody certain
fundamental contradictions; to the extent that such contradictions are effective, they
might negate effective legal representation of the poor.
133. N. Tiruchelvam, supra note 29.
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common the objective of deprofessionalizing some aspects of the ad-
ministration of justice. To that extent, the familiar objective of bring-
ing the problems of the poor more fully within the operation of the
formal legal system would conflict with the ideology of popular justice.
The second and third political conditions for an effective legal
services program (that is, a secure legal base for the advocacy of the
interests of the poor and sufficient governing capacity to implement
urban development plans) can be phrased more generally in Madison's
formulation:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control it-
self. 134
This, of course, reflects the ideals of constitutional democracy, or, in
Unger's terms, liberal-capitalist society.135 But a declared commitment
to those ideals, even in the national constitution, is not sufficient. The
ideals must be supported by institutions. It is the weakness of the
necessary political institutions, not the lack of suitable constitutional
language, that most impedes the attainment of prosperity and social
justice in the poor countries. 3 "
134. S. HUNTINGTON, POLITcAL ORDER IN CHANGING SocImTaS 7 (1968) quoting
THE FEDERALISr, No. 51, at 123 (A. Hooker ed. 1964) (J. Madison).
135. See also THE FmnEALIsT, No. 10, at 17-20 (A. Hooker ed. 1964) (J. Madison):
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exer-
cise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists
between his reason and his self-love, his opinions, and his passions will have
a reciprocal influence on each other, and the former will be objects to which
the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights to property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to
a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object
of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of ac-
quiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property im-
mediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views
of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society into different inter-
ests and parties.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republi-
can principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular
vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will
be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on
the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the
public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and
private right against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to pre-
serve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object
to which our inquiries are directed.
136. The statement in the text also applies to social justice in the rich democracies.Washington University Open Scholarship
104 WASHINGT6N UNIVERSITY LAW (-UARTERLY
Gunnar Myrdal has asserted that the poor countries are all "soft
states," characterized by social indiscipline manifested in pervasive
disobedience of laws, rules, and directives-on the part of public of-
ficials as well as private citizens.137
[T]here is little hope in South Asia for rapid development without
greater social discipline, which will not appear without legislation and
regulations enforced by compulsion. All these countries, independent of
their type of government, have in general placed many fewer obliga-
tions much less effectively upon their peoples than have western coun-
tries.
In principle, social discipline can be effected within the framework
of whatever degree of political democracy a country can achieve; in the
end nothing is more dangerous foi democracy than lack of social disci-
pline. But the political and social conditions in these countries block
the enactment of regulations that impose greater obligations. Even
when laws are enacted, they are not observed and cannot easily be en-
forced. This is ultimately what I mean by the term "the soft state."1 8
To explain the ineffectiveness (or "softness") of government in the
poor countries, Samuel P. Huntington has conceived the theory of
political decay. 39 He takes rationalized authority, differentiated struc-
ture, and mass participation as the criteria of political modernity, but
he rejects the common notion that the process of modernization, as it
is actually occurring, represents a movement from traditional to modern
polity, with concurrently increasing rationalization, differentiation,
and participation. Viewing the experience of the countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America since World War II, he finds "a shortage
of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate gov-
ernment,"' 140 as well as
a decline in political order, an undermining of the authority, effective-
ness, and legitimacy of government. There was a lack of civic morale
and public spirit and of political institutions capable of giving meaning
and direction to the'public interest. Not political development but po-
litical decay dominated the scene.141
137. G. MYIWAL, THE CHaLLENGE OF WORLD PovERTY 208 (1970).
138. Id. at 216 (emphasis original).
139. S. HuNiNGror, supra note 134.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id. at 4.
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Huntington's explanation of political decay is that modernization,
through social mobilization and economic development, brings
new social forces into existence more rapidly than political institutions
can be developed to accommodate their demands. Political institutions
are necessary to give effect to public interests. In order to "impose
political socialization as the price of political participation"'14 2 -- to limit
the means that may be employed in politics and to establish a civic
polity-a modem polity requires a high level of institutionalization.
The criteria of political institutionalization are the adaptability, com-
plexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedure.
The key institution is the political party. In most of the modernizing
countries, however, the political parties are weak; they are often deni-
grated and opposed by those in power. As modernization mobilizes
new social forces without a corresponding development of political insti-
tutions, traditional systems of authority are impaired, but not replaced,
by effective new systems. The result, in Huntington's terms, is not
political development, but political decay.
Both Myrdal and Huntington emphasize the ability of government
to control the governed, as distinguished from the other feature of the
Madison formulation, the obligation of government to control itself.'43
Both features are dependent upon a common base of strong political
institutions. Lacking such a base, government may be ineffective in
the performance of legitimate functions, as well as arbitrary in its rela-
142. Id. at 83.
143. Professor Huntington is concerned primarily with the extent and degree to
which government is able to exercise effective authority, and not with such issues as who
governs for whose benefit, or with the values of limitation of government and of consent
and participation on the part of the governed. It is submitted that, within a framework
embracing the values of constitutional democracy, those issues must be considered in as-
sessing political conditions. Nevertheless, Professor Huntington's position is not neces-
sarily anti-democratic. Rather, he may be saying that although effective government
alone is not a sufficient condition, it is a necessary condition for the implementation
of substantive public values, including those of liberty. The inadequate realization of
this necessary condition is the critical problem to which he has chosen to direct atten-
tion.
Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty
without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is au-
thority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where govern-
ment is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and riot-
ing students.
Id. at 7-8. On the other hand, it should be noted that insufficient limitation of authority
can be as significant a problem as insufficient authority. We reject Huntington's identi-
fication of the public interest with the interest of public institutions. Id. at 24-32.
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tions with the weak. As Madison's phrasing suggests, however, the two
objectives also exist in a state of tension; the obligation of the govern-
ment to control itself necessarily limits the ability of government to con-
trol the governed, even in pursuance of legitimate ends.
There are in the world today a number of modernizing countries that
cannot be considered "soft" in their ability to control and impose obli-
gations on the governed. Singapore and South Korea are examples.
There are also a number of countries in which government is legally
obliged to control itself insofar as the exercise of official authority is
concerned. 44 India is one; until martial law, the Philippines was
another.' 45  Few governments, however, are sufficiently able to control
the governed and obliged to control themselves; few of the poorer
countries have realized balanced political development on both sides
of the Madison formulation.
In the absence of balanced political development, the potential role
of an organized program of legal services in bringing about improved
environmental conditions for the urban poor is severely limited. Those
governments possessing sufficient authority to plan effectively and man-
age urban development generally do not tend to place a high priority
on the immediate environmental interests of the poor, as compared to
competing urban development objectives of efficiency, economic
growth, and national pride. 46  The governments of Singapore and
South Korea, for example, have pursued generally equitable policies
144. Without strong political institutions, this obligation does not preclude unlawful
abuse of authority.
145. Under martial law, the government of the Philippines seems to have increased
its ability to control the governed at the expense of its obligation to control itself. The
matter is not quite that simple, however. Its ability to control the governed is in some
respects tenuous and is under challenge by armed insurrection. On the other hand, un-
lawful abuse of official bureaucratic authority appears to have been significantly reduced.
146. As observed by Professor Gamer in R. GAmE, supra note 7, at 132:
Mhis book argues that politically astute, fiscally sound, and administratively
convenient activities are not necessarily beneficial to human beings. The inter-
ests of those who control resources, skills, and administrative and political ca-
pabilities often run counter to what is needed to cater to the needs of people.
By enhancing the power of these individuals, massive urban development and
industrialization programs may be weakening government's ability to serve
human needs, rather than strengthening it as is commonly assumed. Only if
means can be found to broaden the power of those who do not control re-
sources, skills, and administrative and political capabilities, can programs be
made to enhance the tone and substance of the lives of broad masses of the
populace. And only with some fundamental changes in current patterns of in-
dustrialization and urban growth can one hope to broaden that power to any
significant degree.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/9
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of economic and social development, with a strong commitment to
health, education, employment, and higher standards of living for large
and increasing segments of formerly poor populations. 47 The govern-
ments of both countries have developed a strong capacity for urban
planning and development. In both countries, however, urban devel-
opment policies have worked against the interests of the residents of
slums and squatter settlements.
Regardless of whether political institutions enable government to
control the governed effectively, to the extent that they are not de-
veloped sufficiently to oblige government to control itself, effective
representation of the poor in opposition to official urban development
policy will not be permitted. In South Korea, for example, we have
seen that the Legal Aid Foundation established by the government is
not authorized to handle administrative matters and claims against the
government and that, when a church-related community organization
program sought to organize the poor to resist summary clearance of
a squatter settlement, its leaders were arrested. The arrest of the di-
rector of the Indonesian Legal Aid Bureau on charges of subversion
has also been noted. Whether or not his efforts on behalf of poor com-
munities confronted with imminent clearance for urban development
had any part in the government's decision to arrest him, there is a
serious risk in such a political setting that aggressive advocacy in
opposition to government will be associated with subversion.
In the absence of significant legal restraints on governmental au-
thority, lawyers are unlikely to make the most effective advocates of
the interests of the poor. Not only is nonlegal advocacy outside their
roles, but those roles may positively inhibit them as political advo-
cates."48 Legal aid lawyers have not been notably aggressive in repre-
senting the interests of residents of slums and squatter settlements in
Singapore. In Korea, the urban poor have received more substantial
representation by clergymen and elected politicians than by lawyers.
Similarly, after the initiation of martial law in the Philippines, when
determination of the fate of squatter settlements shifted from legislative
147. See Adelman, supra note 50.
148. Cf. McAuslan, Planning Law's Contribution to the Problems of an Urban So-
dety, 37 MODERN L. REv. 134-53 (1974); McAuslan, The Plan, the Planners and the
Lawyers, 1971 Pun. LAw 247; Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Anti-Poverty Pro-
gram, 31 LAw & CoraM P. PRon. 211 (1966); Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers,
79 YALE L.. 1069 (1970); sources cited note 30 supra.
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and judicial processes to administrative fiat, the most effective advocacy
of the interests of squatters was provided by a prominent clergyman.
In contrast are those countries in which government is obliged to
control itself, but unable to control the governed. Such a gov-
ernment may tolerate vigorous advocacy of the interests of the
poor and may adopt urban development policies more responsive to
their needs. Here too, however, the potential role of organized legal
services to the poor is limited. In the Philippines, for example, the
dynamics of the political process provided considerable legal represen-
tation for the poor, even without the services of an organized legal aid
program. More important than legal representation was the political
representation squatters were often able to obtain in exchange for their
votes. Also, to the extent that legal representation consists of obstruc-
tion of legal process, the propriety and practicality of an organized pro-
gram to provide representation are at least open to question. More
fundamentally, unless political institutions are strong enough to support
effective urban planning and development, the poor can gain no more
than the negative power of delaying or halting actions contrary to their
interests. Positive environmental management policies that assist the
poor, such as the systematic development of sites-and-services projects
in the context of a coherent strategy of urban development, will be
vitiated by the inability of government to execute them. The failure
of the Philippine government to implement legislation providing for the
development and distribution of lots to the residents of the Tondo
Foreshore Land and the lack of coherent programs for the settlement
of Sapang Palay and the rebuilding of the area destroyed by the Tondo
fire arose not from an insufficiency of planning knowledge and tech-
nique, but from the response of a variety of actors to the conditions of
a highly pluralistic political system inadequately disciplined by the po-
litical institutions necessary to give effect to broader, longer range pub-
lic interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
The urban development policies of nearly all countries--even those
pursuing general economic and social development policies favorable
to the welfare of the majority of their people-are inconsistent with
the immediate environmental interests of the poor, whose greatest
needs are secure tenure in a location accessible to employment oppor-
tunities and essential urban services such as water, drainage, and sani-
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tation. A sites-and-services policy represents a minimal approach
to meeting those needs. Such a policy requires, first, a will-
ingness on the part of the government to allocate valuable land and
relatively modest financial resources to the use of the poor and to
recognize that minimal standards of housing and community design can
be compatible with national pride. The second requirement is an
ability on the part of government to implement the necessary urban
development plans and projects. A program of legal services to the
poor could serve an essentially technical role in the implementation of
such a policy. Nevertheless, there is little such a program could do
either to induce government to adopt or to enable it to implement such
a policy in the absence of a high level of balanced political develop-
ment.
In most of the developing countries, the requisite political conditions
do not exist to permit the successful institution of a legal services pro-
gram to assist the poor in relation to urban development. Of the
many nations whose professed ideologies are sympathetic to the as-
sumptions of this kind of a program, most lack sufficient political ca-
pacity to carry out urban development policies requiring the exercise
of a reasonable degree of control over urban land use, which, as experi-
ence in the United States exemplifies, is one of the most difficult tasks
that government can attempt. On the other hand, those governments
that do have the ability to control urban land use effectively would be un-
likely to tolerate a program designed to obtain and enforce legal rights
for the poor and corresponding legal obligations on the part of the gov-
ernment.
Assuming, however, that reasonably favorable political conditions
exist, what should be the characteristics of such a program? First, it
should be directed principally toward goyernmental planning processes
rather than litigation or statutory regulation. The urban poor do not
have significant rights in private or public law to decent housing and
environmental conditions. The private sector in most developing coun-
tries is simply not providing adequately for the poor, and no amount
of litigation or regulation will change this. Rent control and housing
code enforcement are irrelevant to the condition of the squatter and
cannot provide adequate housing opportunities to low income tenants.
Arguably, the hypothetical program should allocate a modest portion of
its resources to landlord-tenant relations, since the experience would
shed some light on the nature of the urban housing problem. But it
Vol. 1975:45] 109
Washington University Open Scholarship
110 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
would be a misdirection of scarce resources to give major importance
to private sector relations. The need is for an adequate urban infra-
structure and for more and better housing; neither litigation nor regula-
tion can produce either. Nor are there, in the developing countries,
constitutional and statutory rights pursuant to which the courts could
compel government to provide sound housing and community facilities
to the poor.
Secondly, the program should focus upon urban land policy rather
than housing per se. With the exception of Singapore, Hong Kong,
and possibly some of the Latin American countries, the developing
countries are not able to undertake massive housing programs for the
poor. If the urban poor are given secure tenure on small parcels of land,
they will produce their own housing. The task for government is to make
low cost land available at locations accessible to employment opportuni-
ties and, in accordance with minimal planning standards, to provide
water, sanitation, and access.
Thirdly, the program should be established in close cooperation with
the national government, particularly those agencies that make the real
decisions on urban development policy and programs. The program
cannot be unduly militant and must be capable of working with the
decision-making agencies. Unless the government has made a political
decision that the interests of the urban poor are worthy of genuine con-
sideration, a legal services program will be either futile or vulnerable
to suppression as soon as it becomes effective.
Fourthly, the program should establish close relations with the indi-
genous organizations of the poor. Rather than representing individ-
uals, it should represent groups of poor squatters and tenants affected
by particular development projects. It would be a delusion, however,
to think that a legal services program can or should "organize" the
poor.
Fifthly, the program should include engineering and urban planning
expertise. Indeed, what we are describing could be viewed more as
a moderate form of advocacy planning than as a legal services program.
Regardless of the label, however, lawyers will be necessary or at least
useful to deal with problems involving land tenure relations, adminis-
trative procedure, the drafting of laws, regulations and agreements,
and, most important, negotiation with government.
If a program of this kind seems unrealistic, that is because it is predi-
cated on the assumptions that government is willing to give significnat
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weight to the interests of the poor in the allocation of land and other
scarce resources and that it is able to plan and execute urban develop-
ment programs effectively. When those assumptions reflect reality,
the most difficult obstacles to a better deal for the poor will have been
realized. Although fundamentally the problem is one of political or-
ganization, lawyers do have a role to play in bringing such conditions
into being. Where possible, programs of legal services to the poor
should be instituted, if for no greater purpose than to clarify the issues
and add to the pressures for a more effective and democratic political
order. The task should be approached with careful consideration of
the political conditions of the particular country and with a healthy
skepticism about probable results. An organized program of legal ser-
vices could play a useful part in the formulation and implementation
of urban development policies more favorable to the poor; by itself,
however, a legal service program can do little to enhance either the
willingness or the ability of government to adopt and implement the
necessary policies.
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